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What Children Know
When They Know
What a Name Is
The Non-Cartesian View of
Language Acquisition1
by Stuart Shanker
Nativist theories of language insist that an infant must possess
some abstract concepts about the structure of language or, at the
very least, some word-learning biases to be able to acquire the
sorts of skills and knowledge displayed by competent language-
speakers. A direct consequence of Cartesian epistemology, nativ-
ism limits the role of linguistic anthropology to validating its
claim that children typically acquire language in essentially the
same manner, regardless of the culture in which they are raised.
It seeks to confine linguistic anthropology to the study of the so-
cialization processes whereby children use their “innate” linguis-
tic knowledge to become accepted members of their community.
Linguistic anthropologists, in contrast, see field studies as a way
of discovering what children in different societies actually learn
about a language when they learn how to speak. In this non-Car-
tesian approach, children are seen as learning how to do different
kinds of things with words—how to engage in the culturally sig-
nificant actions that make up their community’s “form of life.”
The case of proper names in Anglo-American and Navaho cul-
ture is here examined as an illustration of the significance of this
epistemological shift.
s t u a r t s h a n k e r is a Professor of Philosophy and Psychology
at Atkinson College, York University (North York, Ont., Canada
M3J 1P3 [shanker@yorku.ca]). Born in 1952, he was educated at
the University of Toronto (B.A., 1975; M.A., 1978) and at Oxford
University (B.A., 1977; B.Phil., 1981; D.Phil., 1984). He is com-
pleting a book on the philosophy and psychology of language
and, with Stanley Greenspan, conducting a long-term research
program on infants’ intellectual and emotional growth and an-
other aimed at identifying early signs of developing autism spec-
trum disorder. His publications include Wittgenstein and the
Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Croom
Helm, 1987), Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of AI
(London: Routledge, 1998), and (with Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and
Talbot J. Taylor), Apes, Language, and the Human Mind (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). The present paper was sub-
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1. This paper was written in close cooperation with Willow Powers,
an adjunct professor of anthropology at the University of New Mex-
ico. In addition to discussing every point contained in this paper,
she was my primary resource for the discussion of Navajo naming
practices, and she played an instrumental role in developing the
anthropological view of the meaning of proper names presented in
the final section. I am also grateful to Keith Basso, Penny Brown,
Jeff Coulter, Barbara King, and Peter Hacker for their considerable
help and to the anonymous readers of the first draft of this paper,
For a philosopher of language first exposed to linguistic
anthropology through the writings of nativist theorists,
it is something of a shock to read the actual anthropo-
logical texts, for the approach to the study of language
development carved out by linguistic anthropologists
bears scant resemblance to the manner in which it has
been represented in nativist writings (see Pinker 1994,
Crago et al. 1997, Gopnik et al. 1997). Far from consti-
tuting the ethnographic contingent in the nativist search
for universal structures, linguistic anthropologists have
opened up a very different way of looking at language
development both in itself and in terms of its relation
to other aspects of child development. What this aspect
shift calls into question is not just the nativist view of
language acquisition as a maturational process but, more
fundamentally, the Cartesian assumptions that underpin
that view.
A philosopher of language can, of course, be expected
to be preoccupied with epistemological questions, but
linguistic anthropologists have been just as concerned
with the problems raised by Cartesian epistemology. Na-
tivism—which, as we shall see, is the direct consequence
of Cartesian epistemology—establishes a paradigm that
dictates the role that anthropology can play in the study
of a child’s linguistic development. In essence, the na-
tivist insists that an infant must possess some abstract
concepts about the structure of language or, at the very
least, some word-learning biases to be able to acquire the
sorts of skills and knowledge displayed by competent
language-speakers. In this respect, nativist thinking
about language appropriates for itself the title, once
claimed by Enlightenment philosophers, of “Queen of
the Sciences” while anthropology is relegated to the
status of a footman. The question that linguistic an-
thropology forces us to address, however, is how our
views about the nature and development of language
must change once our thinking is freed from the dictates
of Cartesian epistemology.
The most important contemporary nativist theorist
about language is, of course, Noam Chomsky. Chomsky
(1959) claimed in his famous “poverty of the stimulus”
argument that children must know general principles of
syntax that could not possibly have been acquired from
input but must be built into the human mind. More
recently, constraint theorists have argued that children
must come to the task of acquiring category terms
equipped with “some assumptions about the nature of
categories and about the nature of category terms” that
limit the kinds of hypotheses they consider (Markman
1989:7). Thus the Chomskyan nativist concludes that
children must know such things as that the structure of
a sentence is based on the relationship between phrases
rather than on the linear sequence of words, while the
constraint-theory nativist maintains that they must be
biased to interpret each new word as having an extension
who made many invaluable comments. Finally, my enormous debt
to Talbot Taylor is manifest throughout this paper, particularly in
the discussion of the reflexivity of proper names.
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that excludes that of other words. Such “structural prin-
ciples” or “learning biases” are said to be innate in the
uniquely genetic-determinist sense that they are biolog-
ical features of the manner in which the human mind/
brain automatically processes language (spoken or
signed).
These arguments have been subjected to extensive
philosophical critiques of the nativist’s use of epistemic
operators (Baker and Hacker 1984b, Shanker 1996). In
essence the argument here is that by describing a mind/
brain as “knowing,” for example, that the structure of a
sentence is based on the relationship between phrases
one violates the conditions that govern the use of “know-
ing” or “believing” in that these operators can be sig-
nificantly applied only to agents. But the nativist re-
sponds that, even if it makes no sense to speak of a mind/
brain as “knowing” the principle of structure-
dependency, one need simply invent a new term and
speak, for example, of the mind/brain as “cognizing” this
principle (Chomsky 1980). As far as the nativist is con-
cerned, one judges a theory not by how well it accords
with the way we ordinarily talk about the phenomenon
in question but by what it explains and predicts. Hence
all that matters is whether children typically acquire
language in essentially the same manner, regardless of
the culture in which they are raised, and whether it is
necessary to postulate nativist principles in order to ex-
plain this.
The role that the nativist assigns to linguistic anthro-
pology is to validate these claims. Thus Chomskyan na-
tivists—or, as they are more commonly known, “gener-
ativists”—have been drawn to cross-linguistic studies as
a way of buttressing their view of the invariable versus
the socially constructed properties of language and, more
precisely, as a way of refuting the empiricist view that
social factors are essential for linguistic development. In
particular, generativists have sought to show that
“motherese”2 is not a cultural universal—that different
cultures assign different agents (e.g., older siblings) to act
as primary caregivers for considerable periods of time and
that different societies display widely differing amounts
of motherese and in some cases none at all (Pinker 1994).
Generativists thus seek to establish that, given that
there are “universal properties of language” but no “uni-
versal formats of interaction,” it follows that the former
must be due to innate factors—to universal properties of
the human mind (Crago et al. 1997). Crago and col-
leagues concede, however, that, so far, the only “uni-
versals” revealed by cross-linguistic research are (1) “the
presence of language used interactively but not neces-
sarily in interaction with the child” and (2) “the presence
of an affectionate interactional relationship between the
child and others” (p. 76). These two principles do not in
themselves constitute a defence of nativist epistemology.
On the contrary, they are precisely the themes stressed
by interactionists, who are fundamentally opposed to the
2. “Motherese,” or “child-directed speech,” refers to the tonally
and grammatically distinctive manner in which caregivers typically
speak to infants (Bruner 1983).
nativist outlook that one finds in generativism and con-
straint theory. What separates nativists and interaction-
ists is not, however, simply that the latter place much
more emphasis on the importance of social and com-
municational factors for language development (see
Shanker n.d.a). More fundamentally, interactionists in-
sist that “language is learned not because it is a private
symbol system, but because it is a means of communi-
cating with others. Language is embedded in a social
context, from the earliest rudiments of language learning
to subsequent adult use” (Goldstein and Hockenberger
1991:402). In other words, interactionists repudiate the
Cartesian epistemological assumptions that underpin
both generativism and constraint theory.
Clearly, then, generativists and interactionists must
have significantly different interpretations of each of the
above two principles. The generativist reading of the first
point is that, for some reason (undoubtedly genetic), the
child’s mind/brain seems to respond or be attuned only
to language that is used interactively and, hence, that
just being exposed to an artificial language source (e.g.,
a television or a radio) is not sufficient for a child to
acquire language but that one should not confuse the
factors necessary to potentiate the information con-
tained within the “language gene” with the actual con-
tent of that information (which is genetically encoded).
As far as concerns the second point, the generativist re-
gards a child’s emotional development as an important
extrinsic factor for language acquisition in that it may
accelerate or impede the maturational processes in-
volved but considers emotional development incapable
of affecting what a child “innately knows” about
language.
The same point applies to cross-linguistic studies and
thus accounts for the role that nativism assigns to lin-
guistic anthropology. The nativist is primarily interested
in substantiating the claim that “the commonality of
the language milestones across cultures and languages
leads to the conclusion that there are certain fundamen-
tal innate characteristics to the human mind involved
in the acquisition of language” (Crago et al. 1997:87). But
then, the more linguistic anthropology has advanced, the
shorter has become “the list of universal operating prin-
ciples” (Slobin 1992). Indeed, one might argue that, if
linguistic anthropology has buttressed anything, it is the
early descriptivist view that children in different socie-
ties master different grammatical constructions in dif-
ferent orders at different ages. How can the nativist rec-
oncile this evidence of pronounced cultural variability
with the premise that “the linguistic properties of the
mind can be seen as fashioning the variable aspects of
language into an elegant tapestry of multiplicity and at
the same time rendering the common features of acqui-
sition into a statement of equal mental capacity” (Crago
et al. 1997:87)?
The standard nativist response to this objection is that
“the extent of the variability . . . does not prove that
there is nothing at the core” (Crago et al. 1997:87). What
is said to be innate is the capacity to acquire the grammar
of the language used in a particular social environment,
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and the task that confronts language theorists is to ex-
plain the innate constraints on which this capacity rests.
The fact that a child at such-and-such an age may not
yet use some construction merely signifies that the con-
struction in question has not yet matured. The actual
sequence of language-specific structures that a child ac-
quires falls under the heading of the “socially con-
structed” properties of language that are determined by
the frequency with which different societies use different
constructions.3 The basic “grammatical principles”
themselves “are available to the child at birth and remain
constant throughout development. The variation in the
timing of acquisition is due to language-specific factors”
(Crago et al. 1997:81).
In other words, “it is assumed that an innate capacity
for grammatical structure is instantiated in the biolog-
ical make-up of the individual child, [and] the specific
and variable aspects of particular languages . . . influence
the exact manner in which this structure gets filled in”
(Crago et al. 1997:82). It is important to be clear, how-
ever, that the nativist is not interested here in the child’s
perceptual apparatus, in basic cognitive mechanisms
such as memory or attention span, in the constraints on
dyadic interaction that have come about as a result of
the immaturity and plasticity of the infant’s brain, or in
the biological traits which dispose a child, under the
appropriate developmental circumstances, to become a
social agent (Shanker and Taylor 2001). Rather, the na-
tivist believes that “complex abilities like cognition [or
language are] ‘inside us’ all along, albeit in smaller form,
and get passed on to subsequent generations in that form,
and just, as it were, ‘grow’ in individuals” (Richardson
1998:2).
According to this nativist perspective, the primary
task of linguistic anthropology is simply to confirm that
there is nothing in the cross-linguistic data to disprove
this view of the child’s “epistemic” biological make-up.
If the core of the nativist hypothesis is simply that all
children possess a “language capacity,” then cross-lin-
guistic data must ipso facto verify that core. If what chil-
dren know at birth is the most abstract properties of
language, then the fact that they acquire the particular
natural languages to which they are exposed proves that
they possess that “knowledge.”
Thus, nativism allows no scope for linguistic anthro-
pology to play a positive role in our understanding of
how we know what we know about language (Bowerman
and Levinson 2001). Cross-linguistic studies are seen not
as an investigation of what the children of different so-
cieties learn when they learn how to speak but, rather,
as studies of how children learn to apply their “innate
knowledge” of language. That is, nativism seeks to con-
fine linguistic anthropology to the role of studying the
socialization processes whereby children use their “in-
nate” linguistic knowledge to become accepted members
of their community, for what children “know” about
language when they learn how to speak has been defined
3. An argument, incidentally, that is reminiscent of scaffolding
theory.
a priori. But linguistic anthropologists have adopted the
opposite point of view: instead of looking at field studies
as a way of validating (or refuting) the precepts of Car-
tesian epistemology, they see them as a way of discov-
ering what children in different societies actually learn
about language when they learn how to speak. The im-
plications of this epistemological shift for our under-
standing of the nature of language and language devel-
opment is one of the most significant of the many
questions that linguistic anthropology raises.
Non-Cartesian Epistemology
The most obvious problem that one faces when seeking
to explain language development in non-nativist terms
is that children learn how to speak in such a short time
and that so much of their language learning seems to be
automatic. The apparent ease with which children ac-
quire language appears especially remarkable when one
considers the amount of effort that adults must make
when learning a second language. The problem is that,
once one starts explaining the acquisition of these skills
as the result of children’s “tacit knowledge” of the struc-
ture of language, one can postulate any number of ab-
truse rules based on patterned regularities discovered by
language theorists. For example, when children say, “I’m
hungry,” do they know, implicitly, that “I” is a pronoun,
“am” is the first-person present tense of the verb “to
be,” and “hungry” is an adjective? Do they know that
“I’m” is a contraction, and do they know the different
rules for forming first-person, second-person, and third-
person contractions? Are these metalinguistic rules or
the even more abstract generalizations postulated by ge-
nerativist theory even relevant when discussing chil-
dren’s developing linguistic skills? Can one talk about
the development of skills—any skills—in a completely
decontextualized manner?
To answer these questions, let us adopt a much more
literal position than that of the nativist: when we ask
what it is that children know when they say, “I’m hun-
gry,” what we are interested in is what they know and
not what their mind/brains might be said to “cognize.”
And let us be clear that the reason we are interested in
this issue is that we want to find out whether non-na-
tivist and nativist answers to the question of what chil-
dren know when they learn how to speak simply operate
at different—but compatible—levels of explanation or
whether they actually conceptualize language develop-
ment in significantly different terms. What we want to
investigate here is whether linguistic anthropology,
which has sought to free itself from Cartesian episte-
mological assumptions, leads to an altogether different
picture of what children are mastering when they master
language skills and therefore how they acquire language.
Furthermore, the point of such a question is not to dis-
pute the possibility that children typically display con-
sistent regularities that amount to milestones in their
linguistic development. Rather, it is to question the na-
tivist conception of these regularities—to investigate
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whether these milestones prove that the development of
language is “under maturational control,” that is, neu-
robiologically determined by “unitary timing con-
straints” (Petitto 1997:51), or whether their proper elu-
cidation lies at an altogether different level of
explanation.
Let us consider some of the epistemic stages through
which children (typically) proceed in their linguistic de-
velopment. The one minimal thing we are inclined to
say is that, when children say, “I’m hungry,” they know,
in fact, that they are hungry. But, of course, this need
not be the case, even if they actually are hungry. In
Thorndike’s (2000) terms, an association between mak-
ing the sound [aim hungri] and being fed may simply
have been “stamped in.” This is precisely the sceptic’s
point when he criticizes ape-language research—that the
ape does not know what “I’m hungry” means even
though its “trainers” respond to its communicative be-
haviour as if it did (Pinker 1994). So too with children
in this case: they don’t even know that making this
sound is an effective way to get food, for in this context
they don’t know anything. The sound [aim hungri] is no
different here from a newborn’s hungry cry.
Further, even when children intentionally make the
sound [aim hungri] in order to be fed, this does not entail
that they know that [aim hungri] means something. It
may simply be the case that they have learned that mak-
ing this sound has such-and-such an effect on their care-
givers. (Severely autistic children often vocalize in this
manner.) Or they may simply be making the sound be-
cause they like it or find it soothing. Again, even when
they realize that people make sounds to inform each
other about certain things, they may say [aim hungri]
when they are tired as well as when they are hungry.
And, much to their parents’ consternation, they may be-
come intensely agitated when they say [aim hungri] and
their parents insist on feeding them.
Or it may be the case that, from their perspective, what
they are saying is [aimhungri]. Perhaps they know that
this informs their parents that they are hungry, but they
don’t know that their unarticulated expression can be
broken down into components, let alone the parts of
speech assigned by theoretical linguists. (A similar oc-
currence is fairly common when learning a foreign lan-
guage.) Or they may say both [aim hungri] and [hungri
aim], possibly but not necessarily with different inten-
tions in mind.
Or perhaps they say [aim hungri] to tell their parents
that they are hungry but think that [aim] is one of their
pet names, like “sweetheart.” Children have a lot of trou-
ble mastering the use of pronouns, and it may be some
time after they’ve been saying “I’m hungry” before they
come to master the indexical nature of “I” (Owens 1996).
Indeed, one of the more intriguing features of the lan-
guage of autistic children is that they often reverse their
pronouns, saying, for example, “You’re hungry” if they
want to be fed.
Finally, even once they have mastered the basic use of
“I’m hungry” and know when to say “I’m hungry,”
“you’re hungry,” and “she’s (or he’s) hungry,” adults still
know all sorts of things that are beyond them. For ex-
ample, adults who have been schooled will likely know
that “I” is a pronoun, “am” is the first-person present
tense of the verb “to be,” and “hungry” is an adjective
(that is, they will know how to use “pronoun,” “tense,”
and “adjective”). And, of course, children don’t under-
stand why their parents are so annoyed with them when
they announce “I’m hungry” during communion or why
they can’t just walk up to a stranger on the street and
say this, even though it is painfully true.
The nativist will respond that the various steps out-
lined above confuse two different epistemic is-
sues—what a child learns and what a mind/brain (in-
nately) knows. The former aspect of linguistic
knowledge is said to lie in the realm of socialization,
whereas the latter concerns formal knowledge of the
most general principles of language. And further, it is
this formal knowledge that, according to the nativist,
enables the child to learn, for example, what the partic-
ular sound [aim hungri] refers to and when it is appro-
priate to say “I’m hungry.” The nativist is interested in
the universal properties of the human mind that make
language use possible and not in the particulars of cul-
ture-specific language uses.
The nativist depicts this epistemic distinction as the
difference between language socialization and biological
endowment (Pinker 1994). In essence, the nativist is
drawing a fundamental epistemological distinction here
between what an individual learns and what the species
knows. Indeed, it is this distinction that underpins the
current debate over the “language gene” hypothesis
(Shanker n.d.a). According to this hypothesis, individuals
are culture-bound creatures—the bearers of customs, in-
tentions, and volitions—whereas mind/brains exist at a
supraindividual level that transcends the dynamics of
families or communities. Individuals require effort and
practice to master the conventions of their societies, but
the human mind/brain has been programmed by natural
selection to process different kinds of information in dif-
ferent ways. The manner in which individuals learn how
to do things with words may vary from society to society,
but the manner in which the language component of the
mind/brain processes linguistic information is thought
to be predetermined (barring brain damage, genetic mu-
tations, etc.) and to operate mechanically.
To clarify the nature of the distinction that the nativist
is applying to language development, we might consider
the manner in which different societies categorize the
primary colours (even if it is the case that individuals
tend to identify the same prototypical samples of para-
digm primary colours). Human colour vision universally
depends on the interaction of three types of cone cells:
one especially sensitive to red light, another to green
light, and a third to blue light. Each human cone cell
absorbs light in only one of these three sectors of the
spectrum. It now appears that the receptor proteins in
all these cones use retinal, a derivative of vitamin A, to
absorb light, and each tunes the retinal to absorb a dif-
ferent range of wavelengths (cf. Fodor 1983).
Nativist theories of language acquisition are proposing
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that a similar distinction between the biological and the
social applies to language, where, for example, semantics
and pragmatics are variable social phenomena and some
aspect(s) of morphosyntax are a universal processing phe-
nomenon. But then, the question we are concerned with
in this paper is whether the analogy limps badly precisely
at the level of nativist epistemology. One would hardly
want to succumb to the homunculus fallacy of arguing
that the fact that different cone cells are sensitive to
different light spectra amounts to the same thing as say-
ing that these different cone cells know (“cognize”) the
difference between red light, green light, and blue light.
Rather, the subprocesses involved in colour vision are
completely mechanical. It is individuals, not a part of
their visual system, who see red, green, and blue—who
know that such-and-such a colour is “red,” “green,” or
“blue.”
This is not to say that there are no subprocesses that
are relevant to language development in a way that is
comparable to the subprocesses involved in colour vi-
sion. Clearly, for example, a child’s ability to develop
language skills depends on basic capacities relating to
perception (visual and/or auditory), attention, and inhi-
bition.4 But to say that a child must possess a properly
functioning “general auditory processing mechanism” to
draw categorical distinctions between phonemes (Kuhl
and Meltzoff 1997)—for example, that a child must be
able to hear the difference between the sounds /ba/ and
/pa/—does not amount to the same thing as saying that
the child is born with the “implicit knowledge” that a
phoneme is the smallest linguistic unit of sound which
can signal a difference in meaning.
Indeed, the more we learn about the processes involved
in attentional learning and the richly structured social
environment in which children acquire their first words,
the less compelling it becomes to posit special-purpose
word-learning mechanisms (see Tallal and Stark 1981,
Tomasello 2001). Still, mustn’t children know at least
some very general things about language to be able to
learn how to use a proper name correctly? Mustn’t they
at least know, for example, that a sound can be used as
a name for a person and that the sounds that we use as
names for people have different linguistic properties
from the sounds we use to describe what those people
are doing? Without some sort of prior knowledge, how
could children possibly infer that the speakers in their
4. We must be careful, however, not to assume that the same bi-
ological and psychological processes are present in all children, for
the more we study children with developmental disorders, the more
we learn about the atypical processes whereby some children arrive
at language-matched skills (Shanker n.d.a). Moreover, the possibil-
ity that the phenomenon of equifinality—the fact that developing
organisms of the same species can reach the same endpoint via
different developmental pathways—may apply to language devel-
opment in the normal population as well cannot be ruled out. The
norms on which the maturational picture is based are merely de-
scriptive, not explanatory devices based on the typical stages ob-
served in large samples of children. Nor can we rule out the pos-
sibility that different language environments can have different
influences on children’s basic biological and psychological
capacities.
community were referring to the person and not to one
of his actions when they said his name? Clearly, we need
to look more closely at this fundamental epistemological
problem before we can address the significance of view-
ing linguistic anthropology as a way of discovering what
children learn about language when they learn how to
speak.
Radical Indeterminacy of Translation
In order to appreciate the full significance of cross-lin-
guistic studies, we need first to recognize that nativism
is a response to a philosophical, not an empirical scep-
tical problem. All too often one falls into the trap of
searching for ways to respond to this sceptical challenge
without looking at the nature of the problem itself. No
better example of the importance of this point could be
found than Quine’s famous argument for the radical in-
determinacy of translation. According to Quine, a field
linguist trying to construct a dictionary for the language
of some isolated community could never be certain
about having correctly translated the sound “gavagai,”
which the members of the community utter while ob-
serving or pointing at a rabbit. It is now customary to
cite this argument as proving that language would be
unlearnable without at least some background
assumptions.
Significantly, this conclusion is strikingly similar to
the argument that Chomsky presented at much the same
time. Indeed, the famous Chomsky-Quine debate of the
1970s was possible at all because, much as Quine and
Chomsky may have disagreed with each other in their
views about the nature of language and how it is ac-
quired, they made the same epistemological assumptions
(Shanker 1996). It is the source of these assumptions that
we need to uncover if we are to free linguistic anthro-
pology from the dictates of nativist epistemology.
Quine clearly intended for his argument to be read in
anthropological, not hermeneutic, terms. His radical
translator is not supposed to be some solitary scholar
struggling over the text of a dead language. Rather, the
translator is meant to be an ethnographer, freely inter-
acting with informants. The ethnographer can ask them
anything at all about the meaning of “gavagai,” go on
gavagai hunts with them, learn how to identify gavagai
tracks, spot gavagai warrens, prepare gavagai stew, bar-
gain for gavagai pelts, raise gavagai pets, all the while
never quite being sure whether “gavagai” means “rabbit”
or “rabbit-stage” or “There it goes.”
As far as ethnography is concerned, it is important to
bear in mind that Quine provides no reason to suppose
that something has happened that the field linguist can-
not comprehend—some use of “gavagai” that simply lies
outside the realm of the ethnographer’s experience.
Quine has no interest here in ethnographic methodology.
Indeed, as he sets up his problem, even if the informants
were to judge the ethnographer’s use of “gavagai” correct
it would have no bearing on the sceptical problem that
he has raised.
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Part of the fascination of this argument lies in the fact
that it is so counterintuitive. Surely, one wants to argue,
the manner in which a community thinks must be trans-
parent in the way its members speak and act. Surely
observation and participation together will establish
whether someone is referring to a rabbit or to one of its
parts. But Quine’s strategy lies precisely in the fact that
this is one’s immediate response. In effect, he baits the
trap with “gavagai” and then springs it shut with the
follow-up point that whatever questions we ask to de-
termine the reference of “gavagai” will depend upon a
prior translation of what he calls our “individuation ap-
paratus” (e.g., indefinite and definite articles). But the
same sceptical problem arises in regard to this individ-
uation apparatus (Quine 1969:33) as occurred with
“gavagai.”
Quine’s next step is to apply the same argument to
count nouns that are used both as concrete general terms
and as abstract singular terms (e.g., “green”). The ex-
ample here of a colour word prepares us for the coup de
graˆce, which is that this sceptical problem applies just
as forcefully to speaking one’s own language as to cases
of translation.5 In other words, the upshot of the inde-
terminacy-of-translation argument is that “referential
inscrutability” is inherent to language use—so much so
that this third-person sceptical problem can even be ex-
tended to first-person uses (Quine 1969:47).
Thus, Quine’s indeterminacy-of-translation argument
is an instantiation of a much larger sceptical problem
that is intrinsic to Cartesianism, and much of the ar-
gument’s effectiveness stems from this epistemological
framework that frustrates our every attempt to escape
the dilemma in which Quine lands us. The problem here,
as Quine presents it, is that the ethnographer can only
infer from the informants’ behaviour what “gavagai” re-
fers to; he “has no access to native meanings apart from
what he can glean from the observed circumstances of
utterances” (Quine 1970:14). That is, Quine embraces
from the start the standard Cartesian assumption that
meaning and reference are mental phenomena, which as
such are epistemically private. The reason meaning and
reference are inscrutable, therefore, is precisely that ev-
erything mental is inscrutable. The indeterminacy of
translation is simply part of the larger Cartesian problem
of the indeterminacy of the mental.
Quine stresses, however, that, even though ethnog-
raphers can never be certain that they know what their
informants are thinking when they talk about “gava-
gai”—even though I can never be certain that I know
what my neighbour is thinking when she says, “That '
is red,” or, for that matter, what I myself am thinking
when I call something red—the fact is that we nonethe-
less successfully interact with one another verbally. Just
as the radical translator can map different referents onto
5. For example, “We can systematically reconstrue our neighbor’s
apparent references to rabbits as really references to rabbit stages.
. . . We can reconcile all this with our neighbor’s verbal behavior
by cunningly readjusting our translations of his various connecting
predicates so as to compensate for the switch of ontology” (Quine
1969:47).
“gavagai” with no discernible anomalies in the inform-
ants’ behaviour, so too we learn how to use “red” cor-
rectly even though each of us may experience a different
colour sensation when we look at red things. Quine con-
cludes that, as far as the scientific explanation of lin-
guistic intercourse is concerned, meaning and reference
must be idly turning wheels, for “the uniformity that
unites us in communication and belief is a uniformity
of resultant patterns overlying a chaotic subjective di-
versity of connections between words and experience”
(Quine 1960:8). In other words, “words mean only as
their use in sentences is conditioned to sensory stimuli,
verbal and otherwise,” and in turn, we use language in
the expectation that it will cause other agents to do such-
and-such (Quine 1960:17, ix, 8).
Quine was mounting a deliberate challenge to the pre-
vailing view that Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s (1957)
Verbal Behavior had dealt a fatal blow to behaviourism,
and therein lies the key to his intentions in the radical-
indeterminacy-of-translation argument. Quine’s goal
was not to convince us that we never successfully com-
municate with one another; it was to convince us that
we must formulate a different scientific account of the
nature of successful communication, one that makes no
appeal to any of the “old notions of meaning, idea, prop-
osition” that land us in such sceptical dilemmas as that
highlighted by the indeterminacy-of-translation argu-
ment (Quine 1969:304). Quine wants us to accept that
there is no categorial distinction between language qua
verbal behaviour and behaviour simpliciter, that is, that
the contingencies that cause a rat to depress a lever are
no different from those that cause a child to say “gava-
gai” (see Skinner 1957). Hence the scientific explanation
of verbal behaviour must be conducted entirely in terms
of behavioural contingencies and uniform stimulus
conditions.6
Quine’s account of verbal behaviour is subject to its
own set of internal strains and inconsistencies (Shanker
1996), but what interests us here is simply the fact that
his defence of behaviourist theory rests on the assump-
tion that “words are out where we can see and hear
them,” unlike meaning and reference, which are hidden
from observation and perhaps from introspection (Quine
1969:35). In this Cartesian picture, the fundamental
problem that must be explained in the study of language
development is how a child could possibly get from a
null cognitive state to knowing how to use as complex
a system as language without internal constraints. Thus,
much as he may have disliked the nativist premise that
there must be universal properties of the human mind
that make language acquisition possible, even Quine was
forced in the end to concede that “any behaviorist ac-
count of the learning process is openly and emphatically
committed to innate beginnings. The behaviorist rec-
6. For example, a child is conditioned to say “red” in the presence
of red stimuli: “‘Red’ . . . is a happy case where a nearly uniform
stimulatory condition is shared by simultaneous observers. All the
assembles retinas are irradiated by substantially the same red light”
(Quine 1960:7).
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ognizes the indispensability, for any kind of learning, of
prior biases and affinities” (Quine 1970).
It is highly significant that, in Word and Object, Quine
suggested that the best exemplar of the radical translator
is the child acquiring language skills, for herein lies the
key to the nativist view of language acquisition: the child
is construed as engaged in a “translation” process (a
“mapping” problem) that would be radically underde-
termined were it not constrained by innate concepts or
word-learning biases. But what if we should abandon the
Cartesian premise on which this picture of language ac-
quisition as a “translation” process rests, that meaning
and reference are mental phenomena, and instead view
the child developing language skills as learning the tech-
niques required to engage in different kinds of practices?
The child develops communicative intentions within a
richly structured interactional context which involves a
“continuous unfolding of individual action that is sus-
ceptible to being continuously modified by the contin-
uously changing actions of the partner” (Fogel 1993:29).
In such a non-Cartesian view, the child is seen not as
inferring what adults mean when they use such-and-such
a word but, rather, as participating in joint activities that
involve a continuous process of mutual adjustment. The
child acquires through this co-regulated process the
skills that we describe as “language skills” (Shanker and
King n.d., Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, and Taylor 1998,
Hymes 1974).
For example, the child makes a certain arm movement
while the caregiver is saying, “Do you want to be tick-
led?” Eventually sounds or words are introduced (e.g.,
the child says “tickle”). The word “tickle” is introduced
in the context of and becomes an integrated part of the
tickling routine. The meaning of the gesture or the ut-
terance is constituted by the role that it plays in this
routine. That is, the gesture or utterance in this context
becomes a criterion for saying that the child wants to be
tickled rather than evidence of some “hidden mental
state” (the “desire to be tickled”). It is on the basis of
the child’s behaviour (gestures, response to being tickled,
repetition of the gesture as soon as the tickling stops,
etc.) and the context in which this occurs that one says
that the child wants to be tickled. The statement “S is
telling you that she wants to be tickled” does not license
or rest on the inference that S has experienced some
mental state which (a) she first identified and (b) then
chose a word for that she thought would best convey it
to her caregiver. Instead, the statement is grounded in
this particular language game.
In this non-Cartesian approach, a child is seen as learn-
ing how to do different kinds of things with
words—learning the rules for participating in different
kinds of language games—and referring is but one of
those things. According to Cartesianism, the child must
somehow be able to infer what language-speakers are
referring to when they use language. In contrast, the
child is here seen as gradually learning how to participate
in different kinds of social practices (e.g., giving and re-
questing objects, playing peek-a-boo, asking and an-
swering simple questions, etc.). With increasing mastery
of these practices the child is progressively described as
“intending or trying to do such-and-such,” “looking or
hoping for x,” “thinking or believing p,” and so on. Ges-
tures, utterances, and actions serve as the criteria for
what the child thinks or means or understands.
Thus, one of the central questions that linguistic an-
thropology raises is not whether field research provides
us with any evidence about how a child might get from
a null cognitive state to language competence (with or
without any appeal to abstract concepts or unique lan-
guage-learning biases), but, rather, whether cross-lin-
guistic studies provide us with a completely different
perspective on the (culturally variable) processes in-
volved in language development. Instead of asking how
children acquire a free-standing, decontextualized com-
municational system, linguistic anthropology is asking
what sorts of things children learn when they learn how
to engage in the culturally significant actions that make
up their community’s “form of life.” To illustrate the
significance of this shift I will look, in the remainder of
this paper, at the case of proper names, which have long
constituted the paradigm of the Cartesian view of ref-
erential privacy.
Knowledge of Proper Names
There are several reasons that the case of proper names
is so central to the nativist thesis. To begin with there
is the issue of universality. The anthropologist Donald
Brown (who describes himself as a reluctant convert to
nativism) lists proper names as one of the paradigms of
UP, the language spoken by his hypothetical Universal
People (Brown 1991:133). The implication here is that,
although different societies may adopt different naming
conventions (for example, what kinds of names are suit-
able for boys and girls, children and adults, etc.), what-
ever the language there is always a distinct category of
linguistic construct in which “N.N.” rigidly designates
NN. This is not to say, however, that all societies ac-
tually use proper names, let alone use them in the same
way. Amongst the Malagasy, for example, there is a
strong prohibition against the public expression of proper
names (see Keenan 1976). But the fact that different so-
cieties may imbue proper names with different kinds of
properties does not mitigate the fact that every language
has proper names and, according to the nativist, that
what one knows when one knows that “N.N.” is a proper
name is always the same.
Then there is the issue of evolutionary significance.
In a fairly standard view, the turning point in human
evolution was the emergence of the “capacity to under-
stand that entities can be referred to by use of their
jointly known names” (Noble and Davidson 1996:224;
Davidson 1999). In other words, the transition from ear-
lier human species is said to have occurred as the result
of a momentous psychological event that sparked off the
extraordinary cognitive and linguistic development wit-
nessed in Homo sapiens. The mental event in question
was the sudden realization that gestures or sounds could
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be used not just to draw attention to something present
before the speaker but to name that object. In other
words, hominids are said to have crossed the “language
Rubicon” when they realized that gestures or sounds
could be used as symbols that referred to spatiotempo-
rally distant items and events or applied in novel cir-
cumstances (King and Shanker 1997).
This “discontinuity” view of the emergence of the
modern mind and the origins of language is frequently
backed up with various autobiographical memoirs doc-
umenting the profound effect on cognitive and linguistic
development that occurs when a non-linguistic adult
suddenly experiences the so-called naming insight. Per-
haps the most famous of these accounts is Helen Keller’s
description of the moment when she grasped that Miss
Sullivan was spelling out the word “water” on her hand.7
Discontinuity theorists also cite the transition that in-
fants make (generally between the ages of 10 and 13
months) from proto-words to first words. Despite all the
evidence that this transition is gradual and that there is
no clear demarcation between prelexical forms and “true
words” (Bates et al. 1979), the discontinuity theorist ar-
gues that, insofar as this transition rests on the child’s
first experience of the “naming insight,” when it occurs
it is both sudden and complete (like an aspect shift).8
The term “naming insight” alludes to the so-called
Eureka phenomenon, named for Archimedes’ exclama-
tion on his discovery that the volume of an irregular solid
could be measured by the displacement of water. It refers
to the psychological experience that is said to occur
when an infant first realizes that certain sounds or ges-
tured are names of objects (McShane 1979). Hitherto the
infant has performed basic communicative functions us-
ing proto-words, “phonetically consistent forms” which
are highly idiosyncratic and context-bound (Halliday
1975). But all of a sudden the infant grasps how names
as such are “mapped onto a representation of objects,
actions, events, and attributes in the environment, not
merely paired with a particular event” (Adamson 1995:
169). Once this “mental act” of referring has been ex-
perienced, the acquisition of language proper can take
place.9
Putting all these factors together, we can see why
proper names play such an important role in the Car-
tesian view of language. Proper names constitute a par-
adigm for the mental act that is thought to occur in an
act of reference per se (Wittgenstein 1953). Nouns are
seen as names of very different kinds of things. Proper
names are the names of individuals belonging to such
7. “Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something forgot-
ten—a thrill of returning thought; and somehow the mystery of
language was revealed to me” (Keller 1990:16; cf. Schaller 1991).
8. For example, Alan Kamhi reported that “at 6 p.m. on the evening
of 22 February [his daughter] Alison realized that words could be
used to name objects” (Kamhi 1986:159).
9. In Kamhi’s words: “Alison had finally learned that words could
be used to refer to concepts independently of her communicative
experiences with these concepts. Once she realized this symbolic
property of language, she solved the problem of genuine reference
and began to produce her first words” (1986:159).
natural kinds as people, places, and animals. Le´vi-Strauss
sought to define proper names as the limiting case in
any system that individuates the members of a class (and
all human societies individuate their members, even
though some societies may do so with an ordinal system
of proper names or with birth-order names or may wait
several years until a name becomes “vacant” that can
be given to the child). In this schema, proper names are
said to represent the class of individuals “at their most
modest” (Le´vi-Strauss 1962:197); in many cases they
serve as a sort of place marker until one of the other
kinds of name (e.g., ceremonial names, kinship terms,
necronyms, nicknames, patronyms, teknonyms, titles)
can be assigned. The problem with this argument is that
there are countless cases in which an individual’s proper
name entails obligations to the natural and/or the social
environment (see Wagner 1972). But what Le´vi-Strauss
was driving at is that, while proper names are not the
central linguistic phenomenon that 19th-century phi-
losophers had assumed, they nonetheless constitute the
paradigm of referring—the pure mental act involved in
knowing that “N.N.” refers to NN, which is always the
same, in every human mind, regardless of the kind of
thing named or the various cultural properties associated
with names.
The view that proper names are rigid designators10 can
be traced to John Stuart Mill’s argument that proper
names refer as the result of an arbitrary connection es-
tablished between a name and its referent and have no
associated (connotational) meaning (Mill 1843). Gottlob
Frege challenged this view of proper names in “Sinn und
Bedeutung” (1970[1891]). He argued that Mill’s view of
proper names could not explain our ability to understand
sentences that contain an “empty name” (e.g., the name
of a fictional character). Nor could it explain the fact
that non-trivial identity statements can convey mean-
ingful information, for according to Mill’s conception of
proper names saying “Hesperus is Phosphorus” would
be no more informative than saying “Hesperus is Hes-
perus.”11 Thus Frege set out to show that proper names
must have both a sense and a reference. His conception
of what the sense of a proper name might consist in is
notoriously vague (he refers to the sense of a name as
the “mode of presentation” of an entity), but in essence
he seems to have regarded it as the value of a function
for an argument (i.e., as a definite description). His goal
was to establish that one understands a sentence if one
knows its structure and the meaning of each of its con-
stituents, and therefore it was essential for him to show
how the sense of a proper name contributed to the overall
sense of the sentence in which it was embedded (Baker
and Hacker 1984a).
10. A proper name is said to be a rigid designator in the sense that
it refers to the same individual at all times and in all situations
(including counterfactual conditions), regardless of who is using
that proper name or when and where that name is being used (see
Kripke 1980).
11. The argument refers, of course, to the discovery that the so-
called evening star and the morning star were one and the same,
the planet Venus.
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The questions raised by Frege about the semantics of
proper names were at the forefront of the philosophy of
language throughout the 20th century (Baker and Hacker
1980). The debate was essentially over whether a proper
name has a meaning consisting of a uniquely identifying
description or cluster of descriptions or is a rigid desig-
nator. But despite these disagreements over whether the
meaning of a proper name consists in a mental repre-
sentation of the person it denotes or a set of identifying
features of that person, all Cartesian theories have ac-
cepted that referring is a mental act as opposed to some-
thing that agents do when they use words to perform
speech acts. Moreover, according to the Cartesian view,
mutual understanding occurs—if and when it oc-
curs—when language-speakers associate the same rep-
resentation with the same name. Hence it follows, given
the indeterminacy of reference, that there must be con-
straints operating if a child is ever to master the use of
proper names.
The reasoning underlying this nativist conclusion is
as follows: In order to know that “N.N.” is a proper
name, children must know that it picks out a unique
individual, which presupposes that they know that that
individual is a member of a particular kind (Macnamara
1986). To strengthen the view that this knowledge of the
function of proper names is innate, the Cartesian stresses
that children are not explicitly taught that “N.N.” is a
proper name or how to use proper names; rather, they
are said to know intuitively that “N.N.” is a proper name
(Macnamara and Reyes 1994). Thus the Cartesian argues
that “if you show a young child a photo of ‘Eric the Red’
in a book, the child instinctively grasps that ‘Erik the
Red’ is all one name, and what’s more, that it is the name
of the person in the photo and not the name of the photo
itself” (Macnamara and Reyes 1994). Moreover, children
seem to be instinctively attuned to regard certain sounds
in certain situations as rigidly designating persons. This
fact is especially noteworthy, according to the nativist,
when one considers how many different aspects of NN
there are to which “N.N.” might be referring.
For example, we might say to a child, “That’s Red,”
referring to the colour of a man’s hair or his sweater or
to the man himself. How does the child know, in the
latter context, that “Red” refers to the person and not
to the colour of his hair or his sweater? And how does
the child know that another man with red hair or a red
sweater is not automatically called “Red”? Or that all
other men are not called “Red”? And how does the child
know, on encountering Red a few years later, when he
has gone bald, that he is still called “Red”? And, sup-
posing that NN was sitting the first time and standing
the next, and so on, how does the child know that none
of this has any bearing on what NN is called? (Suppose
his name was “Sitting Bull.”) For that matter, how does
the child single out the sound [red] from the continuous
speech stream [ðaetzred]?
The Cartesian argues that the open-ended nature of
the myriad ambiguities with which children are con-
fronted when they hear adults using proper names re-
veals a crucial fact about the built-in constraints that
must be governing their cognitive and linguistic pro-
cessing:12 in order to know that “N.N.” designates NN,
they must know the category to which NN belongs and
the grammatical category to which “N.N.” belongs
(Macnamara 1986). Children cannot know that “Red”
refers to Red unless they see what people have in com-
mon and therefore see the person Red and not some part
or attribute of Red; and they cannot know that “Red” is
a proper name unless they know how to combine proper
names with other symbols.
There are thus two interrelated themes underlying the
nativist conception of proper names. The first is the Car-
tesian premise that, in acquiring language, the child’s
mind/brain is confronted with the problem of mapping
words onto mental representations. The point of the
sceptical argument about the radical indeterminacy of
reference is to establish that, without innate cognitive
biases, a child would never be able to map the right
names onto the individuals that they designate. The sec-
ond part of the argument is that to know that “N.N.” is
NN’s name the child must know the grammatical role
of proper names in sentential constructions. Thus the
Cartesian concludes that not only are proper names the
same thing in every language but, further, to know what
a proper name is is the same thing in every human mind.
In other words, children are born with the implicit
knowledge that “N.N.s” are used to designate NNs, and
all they have to learn is particular “N.N.”–NN pairings
and the conventions adopted by their society for publicly
using “N.N.”
But what if a child uses “N.N.” correctly, according
to accepted social customs, but thinks that “N.N.” refers
to some part of NN and not to the person NN? What if
the child does not even possess the concept person? This
would mean that, despite having mastered all of the ap-
propriate social conventions for using proper names, the
child nonetheless does not understand that “Red” is a
proper name. This incongruity is precisely the point of
the behaviourist conclusion that Quine sought to draw
from his argument about the radical indeterminacy of
translation. The upshot of Cartesian epistemology is that
the classification of a common noun as a proper name
depends on the mental representation that the agent as-
sociates with that term; the manner in which the word
is used is said to be irrelevant to its status as a proper
name. Thus, even if the child should say that “Red” is
Red’s name, use “Red” appropriately when greeting or
calling him, etc., this would not ensure that the child
was using Red as a proper name; these social rituals
might simply have been conditioned or memorized.
In terms of the Cartesian conception of reference, we
12. The argument here is that, insofar as there are so many different
things that people might be referring to when they use a name,
children must be “equipped with some assumptions about the na-
ture of categories and about the nature of category terms. These
assumptions limit the kinds of hypotheses children consider. In
other words, children do not always need to reject hypotheses [about
the reference of a name] on the basis of negative evidence. They
can implicitly reject them by being biased against them” (Markman
1989:7).
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have no way of knowing for certain what referent a child
is associating with a term and therefore can never know
for certain whether the child is using a proper name.
Indeed, language-speakers can never know for certain
whether they are both talking about a person, let alone
talking about the same person. And it is precisely here
that nativism enters, not primarily as a way of explaining
the genesis of linguistic knowledge but, rather, as a way
of blocking the sceptical problems that plague Cartesian
semantics. Nativism assigns the relevant cognitive and
grammatical categories—the built-in constraints de-
scribed above—to the hard-wired machinery of the mind.
Thus children have no choice about what kind of thing
they will correlate with “N.N.”: the mental association
between persons and proper names is said to have been
biologically constrained. The psychological leap that our
hominid ancestors are said to have experienced when
they suddenly grasped the representational function of
names was naturally selected, encoded in the human
genome and imprinted on the human mind/brain.
But what if we were to adopt the view that such actions
as the ability to answer the question “What is his
name?”, to use “Red” appropriately in greetings and fare-
wells, etc., justify describing the child as “understanding
that ‘Red’ is Red’s name.” This move has far-reaching
implications for our understanding of the nature of
proper names and the development of the ability to use
proper names. Gone is the assumption that the meaning
of a proper name consists in a mental representation of
the person it denotes or a set of uniquely identifying
features of that person. Gone too is the sceptical problem
about the indeterminacy of reference and, with it, the
demand for built-in cognitive and linguistic constraints
to explain how language-speakers succeed in understand-
ing one another (Taylor 1992). And finally, gone is the
temptation to treat the naming insight as a mental ex-
perience; instead, we compare the ability to use proper
names to the development of other, more prosaic
abilities.
After all, there are countless occasions when one sud-
denly masters a skill in a way that can be described as
a “Eureka phenomenon.” There comes a moment in ten-
nis, for example, when after many fruitless hours of prac-
tice and instruction one suddenly “feels” how to hit a
top-spin forehand. But one would hardly explain this mo-
ment as the result of a mental experience. In this case,
the exclamation “Now I know how to hit the shot!” does
not report on an “epistemic state.” Nor does it describe
the feelings we might have experienced at that precise
moment, even though it is unlikely that we would have
said this had we not experienced a sudden rush of elation
at the distinctive sensation of “brushing up” on the ball.
Rather, we might use this expression to express our con-
viction—which, in far too many instances, is unwar-
ranted—that we shall henceforth be consistently able to
execute this stroke (Shanker 1998).
What if learning how to use proper names is similar
to learning how to hit a difficult tennis shot, insofar as
this is also a skill that a child can only master when
more primitive skills have been attained? To be sure, the
rules involved in language learning are of an order of
magnitude that strain the analogy to tennis. But what is
interesting in the present context is simply that there
are instances in which this skill may be acquired quite
suddenly but that, more commonly, it takes some time
before the child can be said to have mastered it. In the
majority of cases, a child continues to use prelexical
forms alongside true words, and it may not be until
around the age of 18 months that the latter finally start
to predominate (Bates et al. 1979). “A general indication
of the initial difficulty that the child has in coming to
terms with what it is that words do is the fact that the
learning of first words is a very slow process: up to 5–6
months may elapse between the production of the first
word and the production of the tenth” (Harris 1992:70).
But the reason this skill is so difficult to acquire is not
that the child’s mind is having so much trouble making
the leap to “referentiality”: it is that it is difficult for
the child to master the use of conventionalized sounds
(or gestures) in contexts other than the situation in
which they were first acquired.13
Thus, instead of postulating an abrupt transition from
prelexical forms to first words that is brought about by
a nebulous mental experience, this approach considers
the ability to use names as the result of the child’s cog-
nitive development and mastery of various communi-
cative and prelinguistic skills (see Tomasello 2001). Ac-
cording to this non-Cartesian view, “while naming is an
important development in language learning it is not the
first,” for “naming is a fairly advanced function of lan-
guage, presupposing a level of attention on objects and
other phenomena that requires a certain level of social
development” (Beaken 1996:69). In place of the matur-
ational view of the child’s transition through language
milestones that are genetically predetermined, this
model stresses that before mastering the use of names
the child has to go through such developmental stages
as engaging in joint attention (which emerges around the
age of 2 months), turning the head to see where a sound
is coming from (around 3 months), shaking the head to
indicate “no” (6–9 months), using gestures to request
things (around 9 months), intentionally pointing at
things (around 12 months), using sounds and then first
words to coordinate and initiate joint routines, and so
on (Shanker n.d.a).
In other words, what linguistic anthropology shows us
is that, once language development is viewed in non-
Cartesian terms, it becomes apparent that much more
is involved than just acquiring a repertoire of interac-
tional techniques; more fundamentally, language devel-
opment involves enculturation into a community’s dis-
tinctive way of being-in-the-world (Basso 1988). From a
non-Cartesian perspective, the reason Quine’s radical in-
determinacy of translation has the force that it does has
nothing to do with the epistemic privacy of reference
13. This is very much the problem faced by speech-language path-
ologists who must try to assist children suffering from language
deficits to generalize what they have been taught in therapy ses-
sions to novel situations.
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(given that “referring” is something that agents do with
words); rather, the source of the ethnographers’ dilemma
is their social and psychological distance from the “form
of life” that they are seeking to penetrate (Agar 1996).
In this respect, the position in which ethnographers
find themselves can indeed be likened in some ways to
that of children developing language skills, for in mas-
tering a language one is learning ways of behaving that
count, within a community, as the performance of some
culturally conceived act (Shanker and Taylor 2001). But
then, such a comparison highlights a crucial respect in
which learning how to use proper names is not like learn-
ing how to hit a tennis shot. Children cannot be said to
have mastered the use of proper names unless they know
what constitutes a proper name in their linguistic com-
munity, and this last clause is precisely the point that
is denied by the Cartesian nativist account of proper
names.
Hence the question we are ultimately concerned with
here is the significance of abandoning the Cartesian epis-
temological assumption that what one knows when one
knows that “N.N.” is a proper name is logically distinct
from how one’s community uses proper names. What if
what varies from culture to culture is the very things
that children must learn when they learn what consti-
tutes a proper name for their community? If that is the
case, then cross-linguistic studies of naming practices
are crucial for our understanding not just of the concept
of proper name but, indeed, of language development in
general. Such research not only provides us an oppor-
tunity to look more closely at the kinds of skills that
children are mastering when they learn how to use words
but, more important, forces us to shift our focus from
viewing the child in the same way that one might view
a computer program—viz., as equipped with certain heu-
ristics that enable the mind/brain to extract natural
kinds from visual input and proper names from verbal
input—to seeing the child as first and foremost a devel-
oping social agent in a familial and a larger cultural en-
vironment (Ochs 1988).
Learning How to Use Proper Names
Psycholinguistic studies on the development of chil-
dren’s ability to use proper names have been largely (if
not exclusively) confined to the Anglo-American con-
text. This research indicates that one of the first steps
that children take in learning how to use proper names
is learning their own names. This ability begins to
emerge remarkably early: infants typically begin to rec-
ognize their own names around 4 months, which is far
in advance of the cognitive milestones that one might
have thought were prerequisites for name recognition
(e.g., self-recognition, which, judging by the mirror-rec-
ognition test, does not emerge until around 15 months).
Does this discrepancy between cognitive and linguistic
abilities constitute further evidence that children pos-
sess innate knowledge of the construct proper name? Or
does it simply reflect caregivers’ much more frequent
use of those names than any other word when interacting
with them?
The case of name recognition is especially interesting
because it is a step that many would argue is taken by
several animal species as well as humans. Rigorous test-
ing has demonstrated that the chimpanzees Washoe,
Loulis, and Ai, the orang-utan Chantak, and the bonobos
Kanzi and Panbanisha know not only their own names
but the names of other apes in their compound and the
names of the caregivers who work with them (see Gard-
ner and Gardner 1969, Matsuzawa 1996, Miles 1994, Sav-
age-Rumbaugh et al. 1993).14 And many would argue
that, for example, dogs and cats also know their own
names. But this very continuity argument should alert
us to the dangers of overinterpreting children’s earliest
reactions. Speech experts have shown that what, for ex-
ample, a dog is responding to when its name is called is
not the name per se but stress patterns in the vocali-
zation. Hence the question that psycholinguists have
looked at is whether children are similarly responding
to stress patterns instead of recognizing their names
(Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek 1999).
To answer this question, scientists have used a head-
turn procedure to see if children respond differentially
to their own names, different names with the same stress
patterns, and different names with different stress pat-
terns. On the basis of these tests it appears that children
progress through stages as they gradually begin to rec-
ognize their own names. At first they react to their
names in much the same way that one might react to a
doorbell: beginning around the age of 2 months their
faces light up at the sound of their names, but here they
are responding to the sight of the caregiver, which be-
comes associated with the sound. Judging from the head-
turn test, they do not begin to recognize the distinctive
sounds of their names until around the age of 4 months.
They do not actually begin to turn and look expectantly
in the direction from which their names are being called
until around the age of 6–7 months (Golinkoff and Hirsh-
Pasek 1999:52–53). This too is a behaviour that may ap-
pear quite suddenly or may gradually phase in.
At this stage we are dealing with the communicative
techniques that caregivers use to engage infants’ atten-
tion. Infants’ responses to their names are entirely bound
up with their anticipation of effective interaction (a point
which clearly has important implications for the second
of the “universals” noted in the opening section). But,
of course, even once they have begun to recognize their
own names they are still a long way from understanding
“N.N.” as a name. Even if they respond immediately
when their names are called and, further, respond ap-
propriately when asked their names, this may not in
itself constitute sufficient evidence that they know what
their names are. After all, a parrot can perform much the
14. I am indebted to Steve Wise for drawing my attention to Janik’s
(2000) report that bottlenose dolphins imitate the learned whistles
of other members of their group, apparently in order to address those
individuals. Such a finding may have interesting implications for
how we think about the origins of naming practices.
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same feat, as can a computer program. This is a point
that Chomsky (1959) was making in his review of Skin-
ner’s Verbal Behavior—that merely being conditioned
or programmed to respond to such-and-such a sound does
not constitute evidence that S knows that “N.N.” is its
name. But far from supporting a nativist epistemological
conclusion, this is the logical point that a subject cannot
be described as knowing what its name is unless the
subject possesses the relevant social and linguistic
knowledge.
But then, what exactly is the nature of such knowl-
edge? The crux of the non-nativist response to this ques-
tion is that it cannot be separated from the develop-
mental and the cultural context in which it is asked. The
criteria for attributing knowledge to a child are highly
sensitive to that child’s stage of development. (For ex-
ample, we would not expect the young child to know
that proper names are capitalized.) Furthermore, the cri-
teria for describing children as knowing their names can-
not be divorced from the cultural context in which this
knowledge is attributed. Le´vi-Strauss (1962) has de-
scribed a continuum of social naming practices: at the
one extreme are those cultures in which individuals are
named by applying rules that fix the child’s position in
a preordained class or group and, perhaps, formal rules
for acquiring a new name at prespecified junctures in
one’s life, and at the other extreme are those which as-
sign a minimal amount of social information to the name
bestowed on a child and have no rules for assigning new
names according to various rites of passage or the death
of relatives.
To see how this principle operates, we might compare
naming practices in Anglo-American culture with what
Navajo children must learn when they learn what a
name is. The Anglo-American practice of naming15 falls
at the “modest” level in Le´vi-Strauss’s scheme. To de-
scribe a female child in Anglo-American culture as
knowing that “Leila” is her name, for example, we might
require that she know such things as that everyone, re-
gardless of age or sex, has a name, that “Leila” is a girl’s
name, that one’s name is composed of a first name, a
family name, and possibly one or more middle names,
and that siblings have the same family name (typically
taken from the father). As Leila grows older she will be
expected to know which name to use to greet someone
according to the context (e.g., that it is inappropriate to
address people by both first and last names or solely by
their last names). But even when she is older she will
not be expected to know all the things that are expected
of an adult, for example, whether to use a first name for
someone or a formal title (with either the first or the last
name), that in some instances it is permissible to address
people one has just met by their first names and—in the
15. One might object here that we run the risk of reification by
assuming that one can speak without qualification of “the Anglo-
American practice of naming.” Yet one might also argue that the
surprising homogeneity that one finds in Anglo-American naming
practices is precisely the sort of factor that leads one to want to
speak of such a thing as “Anglo-American culture” (see Shanker
n.d.b).
United States but not in Canada—to shorten that name
immediately to a familiar contraction, that it is a sign
of intimacy to address people by their nicknames but
one cannot presuppose intimacy by bestowing a nick-
name on someone one is meeting for the first time, and
so on.
One of the keys to describing Anglo-American naming
as an exemplar of a “modest” practice is the manner in
which names are chosen. It is important to be clear here,
however, that so describing the Anglo-American practice
does not signify that there is not a tremendous amount
of importance assigned to naming. On the contrary, a
child is given a first name as soon as possible after birth
(usually by the parents), and we treat it as an important
sign of psychological distress if a caregiver displays no
interest in naming the child. Children are generally given
two or more names, but only one will be selected as the
child’s “given” name. Young children are rarely called
by their full names; more often, parents will use a di-
minutive of the child’s given name, a pet name, or a
term of endearment.16 It used to be the case that children
were named after a deceased relative or an important
religious or political figure, but it is more common these
days for them to be named after an actor or an athlete
or to be given one of the currently fashionable names.
Interestingly, baby naming has become a commercial
concern; there are self-help books that consist of lists of
possible names, and polls are regularly conducted to
chart current naming trends.17
The possible meaning of a name (e.g., “Grace,” “Char-
ity,” the fact that “Leila” means “night” in Hebrew, etc.)
has become increasingly irrelevant to its adoption in An-
glo-American culture. Very rarely does one hear of a
child’s being named because of a resemblance between
the child and something else (e.g., a natural phenomenon
or another person). It still remains the case that children
are named after important figures, but this seems to con-
stitute more of a statement on the part of the parents
than a belief that by being so named the child will come
to share the character traits of that figure. Names are
rarely taken out of circulation following someone’s death
(although, in an interesting twist on this practice, a
player’s number in professional sports is frequently “re-
tired” to honour a great athlete). In some families, par-
ticular names are regarded as special family possessions
and are passed down from one generation to the next.
Despite the considerable freedom that parents now enjoy
in choosing names, they still continue to observe many
constraints; for example, they are fairly careful to dif-
16. Children quickly learn the significance of being called by their
full names. It is interesting that this usage should have become so
widely adopted in Anglo-American culture as a way of expressing
anger or foretelling punishment. In his account of the Western
Apache “speaking with names” Basso (1988) stresses that the prac-
tice hinges on using place-names in their full form rather than the
usual abbreviated renderings.
17. At the opposite end of this particular spectrum would be the
Balinese practice in which infants’ names are arbitrarily coined
nonsense syllables which have no family connections and are not
duplicated within a community (Geertz 1973).
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ferentiate between “girls”’ and “boys”’ names and to
stick to familiar “American”-sounding names, and there
are clearly societal limits (e.g., recall the commotion
when the singer Grace Slick tried to name her daughter
“God”).
In Anglo-American culture, as, apparently, in all cul-
tures, one’s personal identity and, to some extent, one’s
self-esteem are closely bound up with one’s name. De-
liberately mispronouncing or punning on someone’s
name is frowned upon, and complex libel laws have es-
tablished strict guidelines about the kind of liberties one
can publicly take with someone’s name. Writing one’s
name on different kinds of document and, in some con-
texts, just saying one’s name aloud can have binding
properties.18 Certain names can be viewed as an imped-
iment in certain professions, and, conversely, different
names can be viewed as an asset. And to reject the name
one was given by one’s parents in order to choose one’s
own name is seen as a very significant step requiring
formal certification if it is to be recognized by the state.
Few things are valued as highly as having one’s name
live on after one’s death, and on rare occasions one will
live to see one’s name “immortalized,” for example, by
being used to describe a personality trait or conduct
(“Churchillian”) or name a school of thought (“Wittgen-
steinians”), or prefaced with a definite article (“The Don-
ald”). Changing one’s title (e.g., becoming “Dr.” or “Pro-
fessor” or “CEO”) literally changes one’s social
identity.19 All sorts of subtle messages are conveyed by
the name one is called in certain situations (e.g., being
called by one’s first name in the doctor’s office) or the
name whereby one introduces oneself. And without
doubt, one of the most dehumanizing things one can do
to others is to strip them of their names entirely: hence
the use of numbers rather than names to refer to pris-
oners and, for that matter, the use of “dog tags” in the
armed services or terms of rank rather than names.
The Navajo practice of naming provides an illuminat-
ing contrast with the Anglo-American because it lies
much more towards the socially structured end of the
spectrum. Robert Young noted in 1961: “The personal
name did not formerly function as an instrument for
general identification purposes among the Navajo as it
does among non-Navajos.” According to Young, a baby
was given a “war name” by a close relative who had
been to war. This name was a somewhat stereotyped
18. A fascinating example of the kinds of social acts performed
with proper names can be seen in the use of kinship terms in Chi-
nese marriage: “The essential transformative moment occurs—not,
as in the US, in an overt performative statement I do [agree to be
and am hereby married]—but when she speaks the kinship terms
appropriate for a husband and wife to use. She becomes a wife by
uttering the terms for his relatives” (Blum 1997:362).
19. In certain ethnic groups a child may be given two completely
different names. For example, until recently, a young Jewish child
of European descent always received both an English name and a
Yiddish name. This could be a very significant issue for orthodox
Jewish children, who would frequently see themselves as having
two completely different identities—as moving in two completely
different worlds (and adopting different personalities for each of
these worlds).
phrase describing a warrior’s activity (for boys) or raiding
(for boys and especially for girls). It was not intended for
everyday use but rather was restricted to ceremonies
such as the many healing and blessing rituals.
Young was describing a practice that predated 1960 and
probably extended much farther back in time—certainly
to the 1800s, when Navajos were active in war and raid-
ing, and possibly earlier. In these pre-1960 practices, as
the infant grew he or she would be referred to directly
as Son (Shiyaaz) or Daughter (Shizei), Grandson or Grand-
daughter. This firmly established the child in the net-
work of kin and clan. The child also became known by
a descriptive name such as Big Baby, Big Boy, Grey Girl,
or Laughing Boy (Young 1961:539).
As children grew into adults they continued to be re-
ferred to by kin terms, as well as by a series of descriptive,
occupational, or role terms (cf. Wagner 1972). These de-
scriptive names would often have a little twist to them,
manifesting the Navajos’ love of words and word plays.
Young’s examples (which he gives in English translation)
include The Nephew of Speckled Horse, Tall Salt Clans-
man, Plump Woman, and Deaf Woman. Others would
include Atsidi (Smith) and Chischilli Begay (Curly Hair’s
Son). Men would also be referred to as So-and-So’s Hus-
band and women as So-and-So’s Wife, and if the marriage
broke up these same individuals might be referred to
differently. A name usually reflected a specific attribute
or role and could change in accordance with changes in
the individual’s life or person. Outside one’s community
in a strange but still Navajo environment, one would
introduce oneself by one’s clan, for example, “I’m To
dich’ii’ni’, born for Bit’ahnii.” If one remained in this
new environment, one would receive a new descriptive
name.
The influences and pressures from outside society are
reflected in Navajo naming practices in interesting ways.
From early on, when the Southwest was first a Spanish
outpost and then part of Mexico, many Navajos had
Spanish names. These would have been regarded as ad-
ditional names, specifically used with Spanish-speaking
people. A Navajo’s Spanish name would probably have
been similar in kind to other names and would have
changed from time to time as the groups with which a
Navajo was affiliated or working with changed.
After 1848 the pressures and requirements of the now
dominant Anglo government and American culture in
general began to have a significant influence on Navajo
naming practices. Schools for Indian students—both the
day schools of the early 19th century and the off-reser-
vation boarding schools for Indian children from all
tribes that were established between 1879 and
1900—regularized Indian names, if only to make pro-
nunciation easier for English-speakers. Terrified children
who spoke little English found themselves confronted
by Anglos demanding that they give their names. Even
if they understood the request they were unlikely to
comply, for they had usually been taught not to reveal
their names. Employees at schools for Navajos and the
agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs therefore gave Nav-
ajo children names that conformed to Anglo naming con-
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ventions—a “first” name and a “last” name. These
names sometimes incorporated the descriptive or role
name of the Navajo individual, usually Anglicized. The
children had to accept whatever names the teachers had
given them, for example, the name of an American pres-
ident or general or some other well-known figure or even
the name of the teacher or principal of the school. But
the Navajos probably viewed a name like this as just
another term to be used in specific situations.
The practice of designating Indian people by census
number began in the 1928–29 Census and arose from the
difficulties the non-Indian officials had with Indian
names. As Anglo traders, missionaries, and medical per-
sonnel came into increasing contact with Navajos in the
1930s and as New Deal programs began to provide small
cheques for labour, names (including Navajo words used
as names) were increasingly formalized by the non-Nav-
ajo culture. Influenced by Anglo practices and record
keeping, Navajos began to be identified by one set of
names used over time. Slowly, the habit of extending
one particular name (or phrase, or combination of names)
to one individual and related names to others in that
individual’s family began to become more common
among the Navajos.20
Young also reported that Navajos were sometimes
“named by somewhat sadistic non-Navajo associates or
acquaintances . . . Popeye, Angel Whiskers, Trixie Ca-
lamity,” and other such names, some “unprintable”
(1961:540). Navajos themselves gave Navajo descriptive
terms to Anglos they were acquainted with, such as trad-
ers or agents, and these too reflected physical character-
istics and kin terms. Some of these terms (translated into
English) were Big Tooth, Big Tooth’s Son, Many Horses,
and Angry Woman. Descriptive terms for traders often
referred to ears (Crystal Ears, Little Round Ears) and, on
the few occasions when a name was explained, seemed
to refer to the inability of Anglos to understand either
the Navajo language or a specific situation.
When we compare Anglo-American and Navajo uses
of proper names we can clearly see a number of common
themes. The most obvious is that names are used in both
cultures to refer to individuals and that everyone, re-
gardless of age or sex, has a name. In each culture there
are customs and conventions for naming children, and
names are used to greet one another. What is much more
striking than these commonalities, however, is the dif-
ferences in the conventions and, more important, the
cultural learning of children in relation to their names.
A description of the way in which names are used among
Navajos captures not only some striking conceptual dif-
ferences but also the element of change in practice over
time, which needs to be recognized as much in naming
20. Young gives examples of Navajo words that became formalized
as names by outside usage: hastiin (meaning “man,” often used as
a first name); yazhi (Yazzie, Yazzy, etc., “little”), biye (Begay, “son
of”), atsidi (Atsiddy, Etsiddy, Atcidy, etc., “Smith”), neez (Nez,
“long,” often used as a last name either in Navajo or sometimes
in translation [Long]). It was common to encounter a man named
Hastiin Begay (literally, Son of Man) or a woman called Asdzaani
Nez (Tall Woman).
as in other linguistic acts. Indeed, even the simple act
of greeting is significantly different in the two cultures
(Hall 1994:89–90):
White males (and now most white females) grip the
proffered hand firmly . . . looking the other party di-
rectly in the eye, all of which is intended to convey
interest, honesty, and sincerity. But when we would
do this to the Navajos, it conveyed quite a different
message; a direct, unwavering gaze meant anger. . . .
The Navajo greeting does not center on showing rel-
ative strength and dominance (as it does with two
Anglo males) but is instead a communication in
which there is a mutual assessment of feelings and
expression. As two men approach each other, eye
contact is broken—at about the point where it is
possible to begin to pick up the details of facial ex-
pression. Once this boundary is crossed, they look
past each other, holding the approaching figure in
their peripheral field of vision. To look directly at
the other is tantamount to swearing at them.
And, as we have already seen, announcing one’s own or
using the other person’s name would, in fact, be carefully
avoided.
One of the most striking differences is the Navajo use
of a “ceremonial” name, which would be known only
by a very few and revealed only to those who were most
trusted. Describing Navajo culture in the 1930s, Hall
(1994:26) remarks: “To a Navajo, a person’s name is sa-
cred and is endowed with power; they do not abuse that
power by calling people by their names to their faces.”
Moreover, the ceremonial name was not supposed to be
told to others for fear of misuse or even witchcraft. Hence
it was imperative that children learn as early as possible
the difference between their ceremonial names and de-
scriptive or kin terms. Furthermore, they had to learn
that it was very rude to ask someone directly, “What is
your name?” And one of children’s earliest lessons was
that one must never mention the name of the recently
deceased.
Another striking difference is the absence of surnames
in the pre-1960s naming practices. In Anglo-American
culture, the bond between siblings is cemented by the
family name, which derives from the father’s line. But
in Navajo society the kinship relationship between sib-
lings is based on their uterine bond (which is a further
reflection of the intensity of the mother-child bond in
Navajo society). Witherspoon (1975:31) reports that “it
is the marriage of the father to the mother which ties
the father to his children. When the marriage is dis-
solved, the father-child relationship is behaviourally and
functionally dissolved, or almost so.” In place of the sig-
nificance assigned to the father’s surname in Anglo-
American practice, what really marked Navajo individ-
uals, and what children had to learn very early on, was
the complicated matter of their clan affiliation. This af-
filiation came from the mother, but she was born for her
father’s clan and had in addition the clan affiliations of
her maternal and paternal grandfathers. The importance
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of these kinship ties for the individual was paramount:
one might not marry into one’s clans (which was con-
sidered incestuous), and one was under considerable
moral obligation to one’s fellow clan members to provide
food and other subsistence items and protection.
In general, there was no Navajo “full name” compa-
rable to the Anglo-American one that would be used to
refer to individuals over the course of their lifetimes;
rather, Navajo names were situational, descriptive, and
role-related and often changed over time. Furthermore,
individuals were identified amongst their relatives or
when meeting strangers by a series of identifying words,
the most important of which were their clan affiliations.
Until about the mid-1960s the Navajos gave whichever
of their “names” the situation required or changed to a
new “name” if this seemed more appropriate, presenting
the non-Navajo culture, accustomed to the idea of “one
person/one name,” with a sometimes serious commu-
nication problem.21
Although Navajos are in no doubt as to who they “are”
(the individual has both responsibilities and indepen-
dence in Navajo culture), in the past this individuality
was not marked by a single name. In early Navajo so-
ciety, infants would learn their identities as sets of re-
lationships with other people, and their “ceremonial”
names were reserved for special use by close relations
and in sacred ritual. Navajos now use Anglo naming con-
ventions—a first and last name and sometimes a middle
name—and use their names, as well as the names of
others, in reported speech in much the same way as in
Anglo culture. But many Navajos still have special
names that are used in ceremonies and are not generally
known except by family members and trusted friends.
When we review these differences between Anglo-
American and early Navajo naming practices, it becomes
increasingly problematic to suppose that the essence of
what children know when they know what a proper
name is, is that “N.N.” refers to NN and that it is this
“knowledge” that enables them to grasp what people are
referring to when they use a proper name. Rather, what
children learn is how proper names are used to manage
social relations and, in those societies where this applies,
the place that the name marks in the social hierarchy.22
Thus, what distinguishes children’s knowledge of proper
names is not some underlying cognitive scheme or lin-
guistic form but, rather, their knowledge of the distinc-
21. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Navajos
began to receive general assistance from state and federal sources,
there were instances in which it was not always clear to whom the
cheque should go (e.g., when there were two or more Sam Begays
or Alice Yazzies living in the same community).
22. This point is especially clear in Chinese naming practices,
where individuals are always highly conscious of which name they
should use in speaking to someone of higher or lower status. A
senior may use a junior’s name, but the junior may only use the
proper kinship term to address the senior, and under no circum-
stances should a person be addressed with a pronoun. Thus children
are learning not only how to address their seniors but what their
social status is, and when they adopt this naming practice they are
willingly assenting to their place in this social structure (see Blum
1997).
tive role that proper names play in their community’s
social practices. But to come to terms with the full im-
plications of this remark requires a dramatic reorienta-
tion in our attitudes towards the significance of proper
names.
The Significance of Proper Names
To challenge the Cartesian view of proper names is not
to challenge their cultural significance, for there is some-
thing arresting about the fact that every society attrib-
utes so much importance to assigning names to children.
Moreover, the possession of a proper name seems to be
integral to a child’s developing sense of personal identity.
Indeed, so important is this phenomenon that it has un-
derstandably led some to wonder whether some sort of
Rubicon separating human from non-human was crossed
when hominid societies started using proper names.
As far as concerns the nativist view of the internal
constraints that must underpin children’s capacity to use
proper names, however, the critical point is that children
cannot be said to know what their own or others’ names
are unless they know what they are doing when they say
what their names are, and to possess this knowledge
entails knowing how proper names are used in their cul-
ture. In more general terms, therefore, what children
learn when they learn how to speak is both how to do
things with words and what they are doing with those
words. Hence one of the central points that linguistic
anthropology brings into sharp focus is that children’s
knowledge about language cannot be divorced from the
particular languaculture in which they are raised (Agar
1994). What the “things” are that children are learning
when learning how to do things with words—that is,
what behaviour counts as an instance of any one of
them—is determined by the reflexive practices of the
particular social environment in which they are raised
(see Taylor 1997).
Herein lies the appeal of Quine’s idea of comparing a
child developing language skills to an ethnographer, but,
of course, there are fundamental respects in which a
child is not in the same position as an ethnographer. A
child learning how to use proper names is not testing a
set of hypotheses, nor are proper names some isolated
linguistic construct that a child recognizes as such. The
ethnographer may isolate proper names for the purposes
of conducting a cross-linguistic study, but from the
child’s perspective learning how to use proper names is
just one aspect—albeit an integral one—of interacting
with caregivers, peers, strangers, and others in a socially
appropriate way.
In other words, to learn the language of one’s society
is to learn the sorts of things that are done with words,
and this is a matter of learning the values of one’s culture
(Hymes 1974). For example, one of the most striking
contrasts to emerge from our comparison of Anglo-
American and early Navajo naming practices is how
proper names are bound up with each culture’s deepest
views about the autonomy of the individual, the ties of
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familial relations, and one’s larger social and ethical ob-
ligations. The Anglo-American practice of naming is in-
extricably bound up with the heightened emphasis that
the culture places on individualism and egalitarianism.
To see the force of this point, we might compare Anglo-
American naming with Eugene Zamiatin’s (1952:7) vi-
sion of a dystopia in which proper names have been abol-
ished and in their place citizens are distinguished by
numbers assigned to them sequentially at birth:23
The Numbers, hundreds, thousands of Numbers in
light blue unifs . . . with golden badges on the
chest—the State number of each one, male or fe-
male—the Numbers were walking slowly, four
abreast, exaltedly keeping step. I, we four, were but
one of the innumerable waves of a powerful torrent:
to my left, O-90 (if one of my long-haired ancestors
were writing this a thousand years ago he would
probably call her by that funny word, mine); to my
right, two unknown Numbers, a she-Number and a
he-Number.
The numbering practice of Zamiatin’s “United State”
shares some of the functions performed by proper names
in Anglo-American practice: numbers are used to refer
to individuals, and citizens use them to greet one an-
other. But there are no numbering customs, no choice
in numbers, no “nicknumbers,” no conventions for using
numbers in conversations according to varying contexts,
etc.
What such a comparison highlights is that, while one
of the primary uses of proper names is to refer to people,
it is not the sole function, and to reduce the linguistic
function of proper names to this referential usage would
be to distort what differentiates proper names from la-
bels. The fact that “O-90” can be used to individuate
someone does not mean that “O-90” is ipso facto a
proper name. What is missing in the numbering system
in Zamiatin’s We is all those elements of Anglo-Amer-
ican or Navajo naming practices that serve to define an
individual’s identity and that shape how individuals in-
teract with one another.24
Thus, were one to argue that what one knows when
one knows that “N.N.” is the name of NN is distinct
from the conventions for using “N.N.” (e.g., that what
one knows is that “N.N.” is a “mental representation”
of the person NN), this would entail that what one grasps
when one understands the proper use of “O-90” would
be no different from what one grasps were that same
person to be called by a proper name. And, of course, the
whole point of Zamiatin’s We is to illustrate the fallacy
23. I am mindful of the dangers of citing literature as if it were
“data,” but the following passage affords an important insight even
though it comes from the author’s “mind” (which in this case pro-
vides a very useful “sample of one”!).
24. Even in the Balinese practice described in n. 17 above, in which
“one’s name is what remains to one when all the other socially
much more salient cultural labels attached to one’s person are re-
moved,” it nonetheless remains the case that a person’s name is
one of that person’s most private and closely guarded possessions
(Geertz 1973:370).
of this assumption—to illustrate the internal relation-
ship between the concept of person and the possession
of a proper name, which is depicted so poignantly at the
end of the novel when the last remaining vestige of D-
503’s humanity is destroyed by the State and he reverts
to using numbers instead of proper names.25
The clear implication of this argument, as regards the
case of children learning how to use proper names, is
that they are learning not how to use labels or markers
but how to manage social relations—indeed, how to be
individuals within their society. But the deeper episte-
mological point at issue here concerns the basic premise
of the Cartesian view of proper names, which is that one
must distinguish between the meaning and the use of a
proper name, where the former consists in a mental rep-
resentation of the person (animal or thing) denoted and
the latter consists in the social conventions associated
with the name in question. To grasp the use of a name
is seen as a public activity, which as such is guided by
older social partners, but to grasp the meaning of a proper
name is seen as a private mental experience, which as
such must be “guided” by internal mental constraints.
From the non-Cartesian point of view, however, the prob-
lem is not how children come to have the same mental
representation as the other members of their community
when they use the name “N.N.” but how they come to
perform the appropriate social actions governing the use
of “N.N.”
Instead of assuming an isolated mind and trying to
infer the extension of a term, the non-Cartesian approach
looks at the manner in which children master the use
of different kinds of words in co-regulated activities with
their caregivers (Shanker and King n.d.). The epistemo-
logical problem which demanded the introduction of na-
tivist constraints to explain how children could possibly
come to use proper names simply does not arise, for to
grasp the use of a name just is to grasp its meaning.
Children cannot be said to be using “N.N.” as a proper
name unless they are performing such-and-such a social
act, and performing such-and-such a social act necessi-
tates that they know what they are doing. Hence to talk
about the meaning of proper names has nothing to do
with epistemic privacy; rather, it is to clarify the sorts
of social acts that agents perform when they use proper
names.
In other words, an investigation into the meaning of
proper names is anthropological, not psychological. But
such a study has enormous implications for psycholin-
guistics. Insofar as linguistic anthropology changes our
views about what children acquire when they acquire
language, it significantly influences our views not only
about how children develop language skills but also
25. At the beginning of the novel, despite all the conditioning he
has been subjected to, D-503 cannot help but turn O-90’s number
into a name: “The switchboard clicked. I raised my eyes—O-90, of
course! In half a minute she will be here to take me for the walk.
Dear O-! She always seems to me to look like her name, O-. She
is approximately ten centimetres shorter than the required Mater-
nal Norm. Therefore she appears round all over; the rose-colored
O of her lips is open to meet every word of mine.”
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about what Geertz (1973) calls “the social nature of
thought.” By removing the Cartesian argument for in-
ternal constraints, one is removing the Cartesian as-
sumption that language development must be based on
certain conceptual foundations or predispositions (given
the “architecture” of the mind and the “privacy” of ref-
erence). Of course, it remains possible that empirical in-
vestigations will confirm the universal presence of cer-
tain concepts or biases prior to language acquisition,26
but recent research on concepts of space provides us with
an important example of how linguistic development
drives conceptual development (see Bowerman 1996,
Brown 2001).
Brown and Levinson have shown that different cul-
tures employ different frames of reference to organize
their spatial experience (see Brown and Levinson 2000
for an explanation of the difference between “Absolute,”
“Relative,” and “Intrinsic” systems). What is perhaps
most striking about this research is how, contrary to the
Piagetian assumption that the development of spatial
concepts can be predicted on the basis of a priori rea-
soning about their logical order, we find support for the
Vygotskyan argument that children’s development of
spatial concepts is shaped by the spatial terms employed
in their culture. Thus, to paraphrase what Brown and
Levinson (2000) argue, if the semantics of linguistic ex-
pression L presupposes a conceptual distinction D, then
evidence that child/adult uses L correctly is a criterion
for saying that the child/adult is employing D.
The crux of the logical argument being presented here
is the Wittgensteinian claim that using “to the left of”
and “to the right of” correctly means that S must have
grasped these relative concepts. But whereas the Carte-
sian treats this statement as describing a mental phe-
nomenon, Wittgenstein focuses on the logical character
of the “must” in this proposition. His argument is that
“to say that S uses ‘f’ correctly means that S possesses
the concept f, or, that S ‘sees what is common’ to the
exemplars of f” (1960:135). That is, the criterion for say-
ing “S sees what is common to all the samples of f” or
“S understands what language-speakers are referring to
when they speak of ‘f”’ is correct use of the concept-
word “f”: the criterion for saying the one is the criterion
for saying the others (Shanker 1998). Thus, the ultimate
response to the sceptical dilemma on which Quine
sought to base his argument for the radical indetermi-
nacy of translation is that we cannot understand what
it would mean to suppose that, for example, a child could
use “N.N.” correctly, in all the appropriate circum-
stances, but not know whom “N.N.” refers to. To say
“S uses ‘N.N.’ correctly in all the appropriate circum-
stances” just is to say “S knows whom ‘N.N.’ refers to.”
There can be no doubt that the stages through which
children progress in their gradual mastery of linguistic
skills are related to maturational factors (just as is the
case with the mastery of other skills). But this hardly
26. One could certainly cite evidence to support such an argument
(see, for example, Baillargeon 1987 on the infant’s early grasp of
object permanence).
means that “language acquisition is a matter of growth
and maturation of relatively fixed capacities, under ap-
propriate external conditions. The form of the language
that is acquired is largely determined by internal factors”
(Chomsky 1966:65). It is not built-in linguistic con-
straints but, rather, children’s strong desire to be socially
accepted, the actions of their caregivers and peers, and
the communicative dynamics involved in their affective
development that lead and enable them to conform to
the linguistic behaviour of those around them. Thus, the
answer to our opening question about how our views
about the nature and development of language must
change once our thinking is freed from the dictates of
Cartesian epistemology is that the study of language de-
velopment can no longer be governed by nativist as-
sumptions about the internal constraints that must de-
termine how children acquire language. What linguistic
anthropology has shown us is not how children learn to
apply their “innate knowledge” of language but, rather,
the kinds of things that children in different societies
actually learn when they learn how to speak and how
they acquire these skills (Ochs and Schieffelin 1995).
Comments
david f . armstrong
Gallaudet University, 800 Florida Ave., NE,
Washington, D.C. 20002-3695, U.S.A.
(Dave.Armstrong@gallaudet.edu). 27 iv 01
It is abundantly clear that human beings have some sort
of genetically based program for acquiring language. Oth-
erwise we would, as a species, be speechless (we would
not be able to sign, either), the normal condition among
subjects of the animal kingdom. It is also clear that, at
least with respect to our more elaborated forms of lin-
guistic communication, our nearest relatives, chimpan-
zees, do not have this programming. A necessary caveat
at this point, however, is that we clearly share some of
our linguistic competence with apes and the extent of
the sharing is not yet known. Two interesting questions
emerge from these observations. What is the nature of
the programming—that is, how specific is it? And what
are the nature and extent of the genetic differences that
make it possible?
With respect to the specificity of the programming,
two other fairly obvious observations bear repeating.
First, there are many different languages in the
world—seemingly an argument against specificity—but
they all have certain things in common—apparently an
argument in favor of specificity, hence the debate over
the existence of a “universal grammar.” Second, there
are many other aspects of human behavior that are uni-
versally acquired and that appear to be under some con-
straints with respect to their variability. The rest of this
we call culture. So, if we have a “language acquisition
device,” then we must also have a “culture acquisition
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device”—or, perhaps more properly, devices. I should
state the obvious here—although some linguistic for-
malists have claimed it, it has never been demonstrated
that language is any more complex or any more tightly
constrained than numerous other aspects of culturally
determined behavior. Furthermore, as Shanker points
out, the cultural cannot be disentangled from the lin-
guistic, as competence in a language is ultimately mea-
sured by the appropriate use of its terms in social, that
is, cultural, settings.
With respect to the way in which all of this is genet-
ically programmed, given our marked genetic similarity
to chimpanzees the human increment must be packed
into a relatively small segment of the genome. We can,
however, attempt to make some predictions about this
from what little is actually known about the nature of
those small genetic differences. What is most striking
about the human lineage is that it introduces a paucity
of novel anatomical structures—the differences between
chimpanzees and humans appear to involve develop-
mental differences in maturation rates producing pro-
portional changes in limbs, trunk, and head. Most strik-
ing, of course, is the vast increase in the size of the brain
relative to the rest of the body, producing a much larger
brain, particularly with respect to the cerebral cortex,
but one that is otherwise not remarkably different from
those of chimpanzees. This represents a continuation of
a long-term evolutionary trend in the primates toward
larger brains and more flexible behavior. Nowhere do we
see evidence for the emergence of new “instinctive” re-
sponses—the trend is in the opposite direction.
Shanker rightly criticizes the Neo-Cartesian linguists
for assuming a theoretical stance that points in direc-
tions opposite to those I have just outlined. He points
us, I think, in the right direction as we attempt to resolve
the many competing arguments that have been made
concerning these issues by promoting what I interpret
as an interactionist and explicitly anthropological ap-
proach to language acquisition. In particular, he makes
instructive use of the example of proper names. This
example is so telling because proper names are seemingly
so straightforward with respect to reference, picking out,
as each of them does, just one object. It is in the emer-
gence of meaning and in the complexity of the culturally
determined rules for their use that these terms gain in-
terest. The Neo-Cartesian approach, with its simplifying
assumptions, denies the richness of these socially emer-
gent connections between a language and the culture
within which it functions.
Shanker shows us that the meaning of a proper name,
say, David F. Armstrong, is much more than the exten-
sion of the term, that is, the male human being sitting
in front of a computer on the campus of Gallaudet Uni-
versity composing this comment. I can’t be said to know
the meaning of my own name until I learn that it is not
appropriate to use it in full except in very limited situ-
ations, such as when signing this comment before sub-
mitting it to the editor. But how do I come to learn the
rules governing its use, and how can Shanker know
whether I know its meaning? I can only learn these rules
through years of more or less appropriate interactions
with my fellows, and Shanker can know that I have suc-
ceeded only by observing how I behave in a large variety
of complex social situations. That these rules are not
learned automatically or “instinctively” is shown by the
existence of an English word, “malapropism,” that refers
to our frequent failures to apply them correctly. So the
language acquisition device cannot be disengaged from
the culture acquisition device—the two are inextricably
intertwined—and the unit thus identified already has a
name. It is called the brain.
scott atran and ximena lois
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Mich. 48109, U.S.A. (satran@s.imap.itd.
umich.edu). 18 iv 01
There have been many criticisms of “nativism” in “Car-
tesian linguistics” attacking positions that neither
Chomsky nor any well-known generative grammarian
has ever thought to defend. Shanker’s polemic is no ex-
ception. It involves two spurious claims: (1) that Car-
tesian linguistics (hypothesizing universal, grammar-
specific principles that structure any language acquired
through usual interaction with the learner’s community)
vitiates an understanding of language structure and use
and (2) that nativism permits linguistic anthropology
only to “validate” and “apply” (wrongheaded) generative
principles. Briefly, Chomsky (2000) outlines a language
system of the human brain. The language system reflex-
ively discriminates and categorizes parts of the flux of
human experience as “language” and develops complex
abilities to infer and interpret this highly structured and
structurally peculiar type of human production. There
is nothing intrinsically different about the language sys-
tem—concerning innateness, evolution, or universal-
ity—when compared with the visual system, the im-
mune system, the respiratory system, or any other
complex biological system. Much polemic is driven by
distaste for “innateness,” “genes,” and “evolution.”
Historical and ideological reasons—some well-justi-
fied—explain this aversion. None bear on universal
grammar.
Regarding 1, nothing of substance in Shanker’s claim
pertains to the truth or falsehood of empirical proposals
about specific language structures such as word order
(each language has a specified linear order linking ar-
guments to predicates) or thematic role (roles assigned
to noun-phrase positions, such as subject-agent and ob-
ject-patient in transitive sentences). Without word order
and thematic role there is no apparent way of distin-
guishing “X hits Y” from “Y hits X” or “Hits YX” from
“Hits XY” (Baker 1988). Chimpanzees (or dogs) may
share many intellectual faculties with humans, includ-
ing abilities for adopting propostional attitudes (beliefs,
desires) or symbolizing referents with arbitrary signs
(Shanker’s language “Rubicon”). Without syntactic prin-
ciples, however, they cannot disambiguate from signs
alone the different references that different possible or-
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ders of propositions may describe. The only example
hinting at rudimentary representational order in apes
comes from Kanzi, a bonobo (Savage-Rumbaugh,
Shanker, and Taylor 1998). Kanzi, though, evinces no
consistent subject-predicate structure. His action-action
combinations (e.g., “Chase Bite”) employ two “predi-
cates” and no subject. No human language allows sen-
tences that have no arguments and so cannot express a
proposition. More significant, neither Kanzi nor any
other nonhuman creature recursively embeds structured
strings within strings (clauses, sentences), allowing al-
most limitless expression and production of information.
Logically, if a mind can take fragmentary instances of
experience (relative to the richness of the whole data set)
and spontaneously predict (generalize) the extension of
those scattered cases to an indefinitely large class of com-
plexly related cases, then the inferential structure re-
sponsible for prediction cannot derive from the ex-
perience. Acquiring language structure via “social
interaction” is no more plausible than learning by “os-
mosis.” As Hume noted, structure must be prior to ex-
perience, just as the cranes and architectural drawings
used in building must exist prior to any initial construc-
tion. If humans are organisms whose species attributes
emerged through the same evolutionary processes gov-
erning all other species, there is no alternative to a priori
mental structures’ being evolved biological structures (as
adaptations or by-products of adaptations).
The language system is no more (or less) “autono-
mous” from the ambient social environment or other
mental systems than the visual system is detachable
from ambient light and object patterning or other phys-
ical systems (including, in humans, linguistic and other
cognitive systems of meaning [Marr 1982]). Neither sys-
tem exists or develops in isolation, both being subsys-
tems of even more intricate structures (Hubel 1988). Car-
tesian claims of biological “autonomy” for the language
system or the visual system refer only to a specifiable
level of systemic functioning within a system hierarchy.
Developmental and cognitive psychologists have iden-
tified several structures in human cognitive systems re-
lating to the interface between the language system and
these other systems (Spelke, Phillips, and Woodward
1995). One is the “whole-object constraint” (Carey 1985).
Children of whatever culture or language assume by de-
fault that nouns apply to whole objects (a rabbit) and not
to object parts (a piece of leg, a patch of fur, disparate
patches of fur and leg) or an object-and-its-environment.
Such “innate bias” helps resolve indeterminacy in trans-
lation. An anthropologist who visits an exotic tribe and
sees a tribe member pointing to something that the an-
thropologist identifies as a running deer is fairly safe in
assuming that the tribe member also thought of pointing
to a running deer (and not a moving deer part or a shifting
pattern of fur-and-grass) even if the tribe member also
believes that the deer is someone’s ancestor. If this
weren’t the case—if radical indeterminacy were omni-
present—anthropology would be impossible.
Shanker notes that before learning to talk children en-
gage in joint attention, contingently interact with others
to achieve goals, and so forth. This supposedly under-
mines the Cartesian model. Yet, much work in this
area—called the child’s “theory of mind” or “folk-
psychology”—focuses on nativist issues: How do chil-
dren reliably infer rich mental structures about other
minds from a few gestures and without mastery of lan-
guage? How do children infer that people’s mental struc-
tures (intentions) cause others to act a distance (without
physical contact)? The emerging consensus is that chil-
dren are biologically endowed with a “theory of mind”
that matures with predictable cross-cultural regularity
over the first three years of life (Avis and Harris 1991,
Leslie 1994, Baron-Cohen 1995). Some features of the
developing theory of mind interface with maturing fea-
tures of the developing language system in systematic
ways now under experimental study.
Nothing in Shanker’s comparison of Navajo and An-
glo-American naming relates to, much less undermines,
generativist claims. Many generative grammarians ac-
cept proper names as “rigid designators” that refer to
something outside the mind and whose true meaning
may never be known by any mind (e.g., the true refer-
ence of “Homer” or “Los Angeles” [Longobardi 1994]).
Granted, proper names customarily have wider conno-
tations for Navajos than for Americans, but what has
this to do with the language system or English? Navajos
who speak English presumably use Navajo proper names
in English as in Navajo. English-speakers may use proper
names as Navajos allegedly do: to be a “Roosevelt,” a
“Kennedy,” or a “Windsor” also implies social obli-
gation.
Similar considerations apply to Shanker’s discussion
of Brown and Levinson. Some Australian Aboriginal lan-
guages make little use of prepositions that express rel-
ative spatial position (“to the left of,” “in front of”), re-
lying instead on terms for absolute positioning (cardinal
points). Native speakers have trouble learning English
prepositions in Australian schools. This may have more
to do with difficulties in interfacing with the cognitive
system for relative spatial positioning than with lan-
guage structure as such. Thus, Midwestern farmers more
likely use absolute positioning than New York City folk
in giving directions or locating places, and New Yorkers
probably have a harder time understanding “to the south-
west” than “to the left of.”
Regarding 2, no evidence supports Shanker’s claim.
Generativists show that culture-specific choice of gram-
mar can have wide-ranging implications for interfacing
with other cognitive systems that affect “worldviews”
(in the sense of systematic variations on universal men-
tal structures). Thus, in Warlpiri, an Australian language,
syntactic structure permits incorporation of indefinitely
many subordinate propositions in a single clause (Hale
1986), and therefore Warlpiri can directly convey causal
coincidence and complementarity in time, space, or cir-
cumstance (Nantuwu-ka-parnka-mi-mata p “horse-
run-tired,” meaning “the horse is tired while it is run-
ning”). Themes of complementarity and coincidence
pervade kinship and myth.
Biologists believe that all life consists of universal,
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.019 on October 29, 2018 03:52:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
500 F current anthropology Volume 42, Number 4, August–October 2001
highly structured codings of biological information
(DNA, proteins, genes, cells). Still, biologists go on to
explore diversity at many different levels (bacteria, spe-
cies, individuals, phyla). Similarly, linguistic anthropol-
ogy can use generative grammar to comprehend the di-
versity of languages and the cultural worlds they
describe. This includes the very issues about proper
names that Shanker highlights (Louis 1998).
william hanks
Department of Anthropology, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif. 94720-3710, U.S.A. (wfhanks@SSCL.
Berkeley.edu). 27 iv 01
This is a complex and interesting paper addressing a set
of issues basic to anthropology because they are basic to
the way human languages work as elements of linguistic
practice. Shanker’s argument pits nativists against lin-
guistic anthropologists on the question of what it means
to learn and know a language. For nativists, knowledge
of language is innate and species-specific. It is based on
a capacity that is specifically linguistic, fundamentally
mental, and universal to humans. For linguistic anthro-
pologists, as Shanker portrays them, knowledge of lan-
guage is pretty much the opposite: socially mediated and
therefore society-specific, derived from many things
other than language (e.g., “context”), and highly variable
instead of universally invariant. Shanker’s linguistic an-
thropologists are interested in the full range of things
that children actually learn as they learn to speak,
whereas nativists are interested only in the role of innate
knowledge in potentiating the learning process. Lin-
guistic anthropologists are antimentalist and proceed
from the historical specificity of ethnography, whereas
nativists are exclusively mentalist and proceed from the
universal invariance of theory.
This way of framing the debate is potentially mis-
leading, however, in that it equates linguistic anthro-
pology with nonmentalism, noninnateness, nonuniver-
salism, and the reduction of language to nonlanguage. In
contemporary linguistic anthropology these features are
actually put together in various ways, and the position
for which Shanker argues is but one fairly extreme var-
iant. According to nativism, humans are born with in-
nate, species-specific knowledge of language. When we
say “species-specific,” we mean universal to humans,
essentially invariant across the species. Call this knowl-
edge of language universal grammar, and say that chil-
dren are born with innate knowledge of universal gram-
mar that potentiates language. It is, then, on the basis
of universal grammar that children can come to learn
their own language, which will always conform to the
constraints and principles of universal language. Fur-
thermore, for nativism what matters most in the learn-
ing process is the mise-en-oeuvre of universal grammar,
without which children could not possibly learn their
own language. Languages are so complex and abstract
and the “data” accessible to children so limited that the
learning process must be based on some other knowl-
edge, something already there at birth. This innate hu-
man knowledge of language constitutes a universal base
on which language-specific features are superficial var-
iants. Particular languages are then the accidents of his-
tory, constrained by the necessity of species. The social
is aligned with what is nonuniversal and superficial—not
how the species mind processes language but how speak-
ers of a language do such-and-such with talk. This way
of posing the question serves nativism well by defining
both its own position and the alternatives to it.
Shanker is exactly right to reject this picture of lan-
guages and the trivial role it assigns to social life, but I
think the critique can be pushed farther. Most of lin-
guistic anthropology lies beyond nativism’s bipolar ken.
It is both universalizing and committed to close empir-
ical description of actual languages. It treats language as
a system for thinking but also as a social construction
shaped in relation to the body and actualized in practice.
It is mentalist but refuses to reduce language to thought.
Perhaps most important, mainstream linguistic anthro-
pology has sought neither to isolate linguistic systems
from society nor to collapse language into behavior, as
nativism would have it. It is the coarticulation of form
with social context that linguistic anthropologists study,
not the reduction of the one to the other.
What does it mean, then, to treat language as (a family
of) social practice(s)? Shanker argues that proper names
and, by extension, other forms of singular definite ref-
erence are best analyzed from what used to be called a
pragmatic perspective. Rather than defining them as for-
mal classes with stable semantic representations, we
should treat them as elements of language games. It is
the rules of the games and not the rules of grammar that
underlie the practice of referring. To echo Austin, refer-
ring is one of the things people do with words. But there
is a danger in equating practice with Austinian speech
acts, language games, or rule-governed routines. As usu-
ally conceived, these things are tied to face-to-face in-
teraction, whereas practice cannot be reduced to the face-
to-face or the “ordinary.” In the work of Bourdieu,
Foucault, de Certeau, and other prominent practice the-
orists, the regularities of practice are never described as
rule-governed, and the postulate of the unfettered indi-
vidual speaker is rejected from the outset. At the same
time, there is no necessary rejection of the conceptual
realities of speech practices; it’s just that mental activ-
ities are no less embedded in practice than are other
forms of human engagement. A full-blown practice ap-
proach to referring must synthesize specifically linguis-
tic features of language with an account of native speak-
ers’ ways of interpreting and evaluating language and an
equally rigorous and nonreductive account of what ac-
tually goes on when agents speak. None of these three
factors can be ignored or reduced to the others. Shanker
has opened up an important space at the juncture of lan-
guage and social experience. It will require the joint ef-
forts of anthropologists, linguists, and philosophers to
turn that opening into a framework for practice.
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michel ter hark
Philosophical Institute, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen,
9718 CW Groningen, The Netherlands (m.hark@
planet.nl). 29 iv 01
In this interesting paper, Shanker seeks both to lay bare
and to repudiate what he considers the Cartesian epis-
temological assumptions of the nativist view of language
acquisition as put forward by Noam Chomsky and, more
recently, by constraint theory. At the same time he
makes a philosophical plea for an alternative approach
to language acquisition known as linguistic anthropol-
ogy. These two goals are not unrelated; on the contrary,
Shanker believes that identifying (and rejecting) the Car-
tesian assumptions that underpin the nativist view paves
the way for the anthropological study of language ac-
quisition. Indeed, given his claim that nativism is a “di-
rect consequence” of Cartesian epistemology, it follows
that rejecting the latter undermines the former and thus
allows scope for non-nativist views to play a significant
role in the study of language.
By “Cartesian epistemology” Shanker means not only
the purely philosophical claim that meaning and refer-
ence are private mental phenomena but also the view,
widespread among psycholinguists, that there are uni-
versal properties of the human mind, properties that can
only be accounted for on the assumption of nativism. It
is unclear to me whether the latter view is Cartesian or
can be said to rest on Cartesian assumptions about mean-
ing and reference. The real motive for the search for uni-
versal properties of the mind/brain is not so much Car-
tesian epistemology as what Wittgenstein calls
“referentialism”: the view that the primary function of
many or most words is to refer to things or activities.
The point of Wittgenstein’s criticism of referentialism
in psychology is not that psychological words are not
about thoughts and feelings but that the ways in which
they are about psychological phenomena differ pro-
foundly from the ways in which sentences like “His C-
fibres fire” are about C-fibres. Psychological concepts,
the later Wittgenstein argues, depend on “patterns of
life,” and this implies that their use may lack a deter-
minate sense. The standard reaction of the hard sciences
to indeterminacy of sense—of which cultural variability
is but one example—is to explain it away as an epistemic
shortcoming soon to be repaired by the advance of our
knowledge of a language-gene. The proper reply to this
response is to point out that it rests on a mistaken as-
similation of the use of psychological language to phys-
icalist language. In fact, Shanker beautifully shows how
the idea of referentialism, rather than Cartesian episte-
mology, misconstrues the meaning of proper names. His
ubiquitous use of the idea of Cartesian epistemology is
therefore misleading, even with respect to his own al-
ternative project.
I wonder, furthermore, whether the Chomskyan ap-
proach in psycholinguistics and linguistic anthropology
are as incompatible as Shanker suggests. Shanker cites
Chomsky’s “poverty of the stimulus” argument as a his-
torically influential example of Cartesian linguistics,
saying that Chomsky concluded that children must (tac-
itly) know general principles of syntax that could not
possibly have been acquired from input but must be built
into the mind/brain. Chomsky’s critique of B. F. Skin-
ner’s Verbal Behavior, in the context of which this ar-
gument was put forward, is less a priori than Shanker
suggests. Indeed, Chomsky concedes that it is beyond
question that children acquire a good deal of their (verbal)
behaviour by casual observation and imitation of adults
and other children, but he emphasizes that it is simply
not true that they can learn language only through feed-
back from the environment (Chomsky 1959:43). There
is no incompatibility between this (Cartesian?) view and
the non-Cartesian view that considers children as first
and foremost developing social agents in their familiar
and their larger cultural environment. There is not even
an incompatibility between the much stronger view that
the mind/brain is genetically pre-programmed for gram-
matical behaviour—a claim also defended by Chomsky
and one that Shanker considers Cartesian—and the an-
thropological view which attributes a fundamental role
to learning. Indeed, the fact that human beings learn is
itself genetically determined. I emphasize these points
not because Shanker would deny them but rather to
counterbalance the “retreat from the brain” that so often
characterizes social (“Wittgensteinian”) approaches to
mind and language. Shanker correctly reminds us that
human behaviour (in a very broad sense) provides criteria
for what we call “thought,” “meaning.” and so on, but
this in no way entails that the study of the brain can
never yield facts relevant for the study of mind and lan-
guage. As far as concerns the acquisition of language,
one can (and should) accept the hypothesis that the brain
has the capacity to mediate the acquisition of gram-
matical behaviour, but this does not amount to the same
thing as adopting the (Chomskyan) hypothesis that the
brain contains an inherited grammar nerve-net. Witt-
genstein himself was keenly aware of the (referentialist?)
tendency to project the structure of linguistic rules onto
the brain: “The brain looks like a writing, inviting us to
read it, and yet it isn’t a writing. Suppose humans be-
came more intelligent the more books they owned
—suppose that were a fact, but that it didn’t matter at
all what the books contained” (Wittgenstein 1982:
par.806).
alan rumsey
Department of Anthropology, Research School of
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National
University, Canberra, A.C.T. 0200, Australia
(alr@coombs.anu.edu.au). 2 v 01
Shanker’s article provides much food for thought, both
in the challenge it poses to nativist accounts of language
competence and in the philosophically rigorous defense
it offers linguistic anthropologists for some of their stan-
dard working assumptions. Taking as his test case the
issue of the presumed universality of personal names,
Shanker is able to adduce solid ethnographic evidence
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in support of his argument that “to learn the language
of one’s society is to learn the sorts of things that are
done with words” rather than merely to actualize a spe-
cifically linguistic competence with which we are in-
nately endowed.
The one way in which I would perhaps take the ar-
gument farther is to challenge not only the innateness
hypothesis but the assumption that innateness is to “so-
cial factors” as the universal is to the culturally or lin-
guistically specific. To see what I mean, let us turn to
another form of personal reference that Shanker dis-
cusses more briefly, namely, personal pronouns and the
corresponding grammatical category of person (as sig-
naled, for example, by pronominal affixes on the verb,
verb agreement as in English “I am” versus “You are,”
etc). As Shanker says, pronouns are “indexical.” That is,
unlike common nouns, whose reference depends on
some general sense that can be abstracted from any par-
ticular speech situation in which they are used, the value
of, for example, the pronoun I can only be specified as
“the person who is uttering the present instance of dis-
course containing I” (Benveniste 1966:252, my transla-
tion)1 and you as “the individual spoken to in the present
instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance
you” (Benveniste 1971:218). In other words, again those
of Benveniste (1971:224–25),
I use I only when I am speaking to someone who
will be a you in my address. It is this condition of
dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies
that reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the
one who in turn designates himself as I. . . . neither
of the terms can be conceived without the other;
they are complementary, although according to an
“interior/exterior” opposition, and, at the same
time, they are reversible. If we seek a parallel to
this, we will not find it. The condition of man in
language is unique.
By “condition of man in language” I take Benveniste
to be referring in part to the fact that personal pronouns
are not only without parallel among the communication
systems of other species but also, within the human
world, a cross-linguistic universal (Benveniste 1971:217;
cf. Comrie 1981; Steiner 1975; Brown 1991:133). But they
are also a quintessential example of Shanker’s point that
to learn a language is to learn the sorts of things that
are done with words. This applies at a number of differ-
ent levels of sociocultural specificity, ranging from the
very local to the cross-culturally universal. Toward the
local end of the continuum we have Shanker’s example
of the use of first- and second-person singular forms by
Polynesian chiefs and New Guinea “big men” to refer
to and personify social groups with which they are iden-
tified (Rumsey 1999, 2000). At the other end of the con-
tinuum there is the common core that all uses of per-
sonal pronouns have in common everywhere, namely,
that I refers indexically to the present incumbent of the
1. “La personne qui e´nonce la pre´sente instance de discours con-
tenant je.”
role of speaker and you to that of addressee (however
variable the nature of social personae that may inhabit
these roles) and that these roles are potentially reversible
in the way that Benveniste describes.
The point I want to emphasize is that even at this
entirely universal end of the continuum, Shanker’s con-
clusion is still valid: the acquisition of and competence
in these aspects of language cannot be adequately un-
derstood as a purely organismic phenomenon which is
merely “triggered” by “social factors” in the developing
child’s environment. Rather, a certain basic social sce-
nario—Benveniste’s “condition of dialogue” among per-
spective-swapping human subjects—is built into lan-
guage itself. And equally, the capacity for perspec-
tive-swapping is one for which the human species is
highly evolved, in tandem with but partially distinct
from its capacity for language (Ricard, Girouard, and De´-
carie 1999). The forms all of this may take are highly
variable, as Shanker shows, but even those aspects of it
which are constant need not be taken as evidence for an
innate “mental organ” of the kind posited by Chomsky.
Language does not subsist solely within the human or-
ganism. It also lives in the world at large, where it has
a long natural history which is intimately bound up with
that of the human species both in its species-wide as-
pects and in its more local, culturally specific ones.
betsy rymes
Linguistics Program, University of Georgia, Athens,
Ga. 30602, U.S.A. (brymes@coe.uga.edu). 10 v 01
In his article on the post-Cartesian perspective on names,
Shanker has articulated an important “epistemological
shift,” pointing out that linguistic anthropology has a
vital role to play in revising the nativist view on lan-
guage. He expresses the view that language is not a func-
tion of the individual mind/brain and that knowing
about naming is not something a brainlike homunculus
“cognizes” (as the nativists might have it). Instead, nam-
ing and language use in general are activities that pre-
suppose participation in a Wittgensteinian “form of life.”
Shanker further suggests that probably the most impor-
tant contribution of linguistic anthropology is not to sup-
port or refute nativism but, rather, to discover what the
developing child (or, I would add, adult) learns about
language through participation in community.
That said, I would propose that the best way to illus-
trate this important point is go beyond a discussion of
how one community manages to use a word like gavagai
compatibly or even that different communities have dif-
ferent naming practices. Naming in practice can also be
clarified by looking at how identical names (with the
same referent) are treated differently across varying com-
munities. A cross-community perspective illustrates, by
exemplifying the foundation of meaning in community
practices, the indexicality of naming and provides a way
out of the nativist/behaviorist stalemate. Indexicality,
that is, the “subtle ways in which linguistic forms are
existentially connected with the situations in which
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they are used and the people who use them” (Duranti
2001:32), is critical to a linguistic anthropological un-
derstanding of naming practices.
Consider, for example, the nicknames acquired by cer-
tain gang members in Los Angeles (Rymes 1996). These
names are given on the basis of group membership, and
they are earned, usually, through a violent initiation rite.
Also, they are often inherited from biological or gang-
based kin. For example, someone named Creeper might
name a new and promising member Little Creeper. To
be a member of a gang means to have a name that indexes
that membership and loyalty to a group of friends, or
“family.” Little Creeper can use his name within this
community with pride and respect. However, when he
writes this name in a very different community, for ex-
ample, on a piece of paper at school, he is marked as a
dangerous criminal. A principal might even use this
name as evidence to have him expelled. Thus, though
Little Creeper and the principal share the knowledge that
this name is attached to him, they put this knowledge
into different kinds of practice according to the com-
munity norms with which they are operating. Naming,
in this case, is a practice that takes variable forms, ac-
cording to normative community practices, while the
name itself maintains its singular reference: the boy, Lit-
tle Creeper. Who this boy is considered to be (a loyal
friend versus a criminal threat, for example) changes ac-
cording to the community of practice within which he
is using his name.
This example illustrates how an understanding of the
indexicality of naming can take our language studies be-
yond a nativist-behaviorist debate that Shanker has char-
acterized through references to Chomsky and Pinker, on
the one hand, and Quine, on the other. Names are in-
dexical of community membership, and the ability to
use a name functionally grows out of familiarity with
the practices within that community. This example also
illustrates the ability of linguistic anthropology to pro-
vide a more nuanced description of community than is
typically used in discussions of sense and reference.
There is not simply one “Navajo” or one “Anglo-Amer-
ican” community into which individuals are socialized.
Within these groups, there are multiple communities of
practice. Thus, linguistic anthropology supplies the in-
sights not only of cross-linguistic but also of cross-com-
munity study.
I want to take this discussion a step farther and claim
that these theoretical adjustments have ramifications in
public contexts and in the lives of practical people. An
understanding of naming as indexical practice (rather
than simple labeling) illuminates, for example, the par-
adox of gang membership—a name can simultaneously
index loyalty and criminality. As a result, the conse-
quences for naming can be as severe as expulsion from
school or a trip to jail. Linguistic anthropology, then, as
a way of understanding naming practices, is capable not
only of providing needed relief from a tired Cartesian
nativism but also, in a most practical sense, of recon-
ceptualizing the world, the language practices that con-
struct it, and our actions within it.
p a¨r segerdahl
Department of Linguistics, University of Uppsala, Box
527, S-75120 Uppsala, Sweden (par.segerdahl@
filosofi.uu.se). 26 iv 01
Instead of reading Shanker’s article as a rejection of na-
tivists’ claim that it doesn’t make sense to speak of chil-
dren as learning language, I take Shanker to be expound-
ing the important sense in which nativists are right:
language is not one of the things that children can be
said to learn. The nativist claim is correct, but it is made
for the wrong reasons. Let us turn to the reasons I think
Shanker provides for questioning whether children
“learn” language, reasons having to do with what lan-
guage is.
Shanker emphasizes the complexity of children’s lan-
guage development: “so much more is involved than just
acquiring a repertoire of interactional techniques; more
fundamentally, language development involves encul-
turation into a community’s distinctive way of being-in-
the-world.” Shanker himself avoids the expression “lan-
guage learning,” choosing instead to speak of “language
development” and above all of “enculturation,” thereby
indicating that language is more deeply connected with
how we humans live together than is the notion of a
language: a language, such as French or German, is usu-
ally defined merely in terms of its vocabulary and gram-
mar. Shanker later uses a comparison between Anglo-
American and Navajo naming practices to reveal how
deeply notions of proper names are rooted in forms of
life. Names are used in typical human situations and
activities, and learning what a name is involves becom-
ing familiar with these situations and activities. When
these situations differ, the notion of proper names differs
accordingly. A teacher who finds that one of his pupils
is missing and asks, “Where is George today?” is not
merely asking where the bearer of the name “George”
is located. “George,” in this situation, is the name of a
pupil/classmate whom one can expect to be in school,
and the question expresses that expectation. The ques-
tion “Where is George Bush today?” is different. It con-
tains the name of an official person who is travelling for
officially declared purposes. The question, if asked by
the same teacher, is aimed at determining whether the
pupils are keeping track of where this official person is
travelling and for what announced purposes.
It is difficult to imagine what it would mean to un-
derstand what a proper name is but not know any of the
characteristic situations in which names are used in so
many natural ways. These situations could metaphori-
cally be described as the home of proper names. We nor-
mally don’t have to acquire mastery of these aspects of
the human life form again when we learn to speak a
second language, for we came to master them when we
began to speak the first time. Children’s language de-
velopment, then, is essentially connected with becoming
human, with becoming a natural participant in our hu-
man situations and ways of doing things together; that
is where words belong and are at home, where they have
their uses and natural points.
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I would like to call language, in the sense investigated
by Shanker, our primary language, for it is what we ac-
quire when we begin to speak the first time. Our primary
language is more than our mother tongue, which is
merely a language: it is our human life with words. I
take Shanker to be saying the following: Playing football,
riding bicycles, and studying second languages are delim-
ited human practices that we can survey and describe in
our primary language. We can point at someone and say,
“She is practicing football right now, and she has been
doing so for an hour.” We can even use a clock to de-
termine exactly when she began and when she stopped
practicing football. But we cannot point at a little child
and say, “She has been practicing language for an hour,
but before that she was just playing,” for playing is part
of language development, as is everything else children
do. We can, however, point at a university student and
say, “She is practicing Spanish, and she has been doing
so for an hour.” In contrast to the second languages we
may learn as adults, then, our primary language is not
one of the things we can be said to learn.
Shanker is investigating, in my view, the sense in
which there is a point in nativists’ view of language ac-
quisition as a maturational process. But we must keep
in mind that this process is not a speculative hypothesis
about the child’s brain, and we don’t need neurophy-
siological research to discover it. The maturational pro-
cess of acquiring our primary language is open to view.
Shanker shows that anthropology has a better chance of
understanding this process than linguistics, which tends
to confuse human language with grammatical represen-
tations of the second languages we may learn when we
already know how to speak.
william r. st irton
Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh,
George Square, Edinburgh EH9 9JX, U.K. (phiwrsp@
srv0.arts.ed.ac.uk). 30 iv 01
Shanker makes clear early in his article that his aim is
to attack not only “the nativist view of language acqui-
sition” but also “the Cartesian assumptions that under-
pin the nativist view.” What these Cartesian assump-
tions are is something that must be gathered from brief
remarks scattered throughout the article. Thus he writes,
“Quine embraces from the start the standard Cartesian
assumption that meaning and reference are mental phe-
nomena, which as such are epistemically private.” Later
on, he suggests that Frege, Kripke, and the various phi-
losophers who have held that a proper name has the same
meaning as a cluster of descriptions are all Cartesians
and continues, “All Cartesian theories have accepted
that referring is a mental act as opposed something that
agents do when they use words to perform speech acts.”
There is not much point in arguing about whether
these philosophers really did hold the views Shanker at-
tributes to them, as many of the phrases he uses in char-
acterizing their views, especially “epistemically private”
and “mental act,” are phrases whose meaning is not very
clear. Given that such phrases do not have any univer-
sally accepted meaning in either everyday or philosoph-
ical usage, Shanker would need to explain what they
mean for his historical claims to have any clear sub-
stance. Still, it is very surprising that any philosopher
should be thought to have denied the obvious truth that
agents sometimes refer to objects. Far from denying it,
it is clear that Frege often affirmed it, at least if the verb
“bezeichnen” in his writings may be translated by “refer
to.” For example, in “On Sense and Reference” he wrote,
“The reference (Bedeutung) of a proper name is the very
object which we refer to (bezeichnen) by means of it.”
Shanker does not present any textual evidence to show
that Quine, Frege, and Kripke actually did hold the “Car-
tesian” views that he attributes to them. What of the
nativists, whose nativism is said to be “underpinned” by
Cartesian assumptions? Shanker does not define “nativ-
ism,” but he does say that the most important contem-
porary nativist is Chomsky. Presumably he is referring
to the doctrine that we all owe our success in learning
our native language to having been born with some very
rich and detailed set of relevant dispositions. At any rate,
I shall use “nativism” to refer to this doctrine. In saying
that the latter underpin the former, Shanker presumably
means not just that Cartesian assumptions entail nativ-
ism, for one could agree with that and also agree that
the Cartesian assumptions are absurd without thereby
conceding that there is anything wrong with nativism.
A false thesis can entail a true one. Shanker presumably
wishes to suggest that nativists consciously accept the
Cartesian assumptions and use them in defending their
nativism. Once again, however, he presents no textual
evidence.
If nativism is false, there must be some alternative
explanation of the phenomena it was meant to account
for. One of the main arguments for it goes something
like this: Children growing up will hear a certain limited
set of sentences being pronounced by other people, but
they will also be able to express themselves with a high
degree of success using sentences that they have not
heard others using. How does this happen? Chomsky
insists that it cannot be explained by supposing that chil-
dren make “inductive generalizations.” He is on firm
ground here: given any set of, say, 100 sentences in some
language, countless false grammatical hypotheses about
that language will be inductively supported by reference
to that sample set, just as well as any of the true ones.
Does Shanker have any alternative explanation of the
phenomena for which nativism was meant to account?
He seems to want to present a brief sketch of one in the
very last paragraph of his article. He writes, “It is not
built-in linguistic constraints but, rather, children’s
strong desire to be socially accepted, the actions of their
caregivers and peers,” etc. This seems to miss the point
of Chomsky’s problem, which was not simply to explain
how children succeed in speaking like other people in
their community (that could be achieved by saying as
little as possible or by not pronouncing a sentence unless
they had first heard someone else using it) but to account
for the fact that children succeed in producing gram-
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matically correct sentences even when they have not
heard those sentences before.
ivo strecker
Institute of Ethnology and African Studies, Johannes
Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany (Lydall@em.
uni-frankfurt.de). 29 iv 01
It may be useful to read Shanker’s paper in the light of
earlier texts which have expressed similar kinds of ob-
jections to the Cartesian view of language. Here I want
to draw attention to two such texts.
In U¨ber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen
Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwick-
lung des Menschengeschlechts (1830), Wilhelm von
Humboldt argued that language is not purely the product
of some innate categorial thought but emerges from com-
municative interaction. It is, as Paul Grice would later
put it, the result of sustained cooperation between in-
terlocutors. The “I,” von Humboldt said, depends on the
“You” whose power of thought radiates back to the “I,”
and vice versa. As the “I” and the “You” engage in dis-
course, their very use of language presumes the other’s
power of thought. It presumes that the “You” will try
to understand the “I.” Thus language is a process, the
emerging and creative work of individual minds inter-
preting each other and reinterpreting their cultural her-
itage: “As each language has received its substance from
unknown earlier periods, the work of the mind which
generates the exchange of thoughts is always simulta-
neously directed towards something given, not purely
creating, but refiguring” (Bo¨hler 1995[1830]:38, my trans-
lation).1 This is echoed by Shanker when he sums up his
findings by saying, “It is not built-in linguistic con-
straints but, rather, children’s strong desire to be socially
accepted, the actions of their caregivers and peers, and
the communicative dynamics involved in their affective
development that lead and enable them to conform to
the linguistic behaviour of those around them.”
Of all the modern (and post-modern) anthropological
linguists it is perhaps Stephen Tyler who, in The Said
and the Unsaid (1978), has offered the most thorough
critique of the Neo-Cartesian or Chomskyan view of lan-
guage. With von Humboldt, he starts from the fact that
speech is central to the formation of consciousness and
the self, that “it is only through others that the self re-
veals itself and comes to know itself as something more
than an object” (p. 141). But then, more boldly than an-
yone before or after him, he goes on to envisage a rhe-
torical theory of mind, meaning, and culture. He does
this against a historical background which he sketches
as follows (p. 167):
With the decline of rhetoric, meaning was separated
1. “Da jede schon einen Stoff von fru¨heren Geschlechtern aus uns
unbekannter Vorzeit empfangen hat, so ist die . . . den Gedanken-
ausdruck hervorbringende geistige Ta¨tigkeit immer zugleich auf
etwas schon Gegebenes gerichtet, nicht rein erzeugend, sondern
umgestaltend.”
from the speech event, and the notion of speech or
speaking subordinated to the idea of language.
Meaning by the seventeenth century had become al-
most entirely a property of words rather than deeds,
as revealed primarily in the rationalist philosophers’
[read Descartes’s] equation of thought and language
and in their identification of language as the limit of
reason. To this development the empiricist philoso-
phers added their interpretation of the distinction
between reason and passion. Thought is divided into
the rational and the passionate. The voice of reason
is literal, the voice of passion poetic or metaphoric.
This separation of reason and passion has destroyed
the ethical basis of discourse.
Our task is to heal this “Cartesian rift,” as David
MacDougall (1998) has aptly called it, and overcome the
alienated and alienating separation of reason and passion
prevailing in the human sciences today. Shanker’s cri-
tique of the idea that one might study children’s acqui-
sition of language solely within free-standing, decontex-
tualized communicational systems, his outline of the
social and cultural factors involved in the learning of
proper names, and his insistence that “proper names are
bound up with each culture’s deepest views about the
autonomy of the individual, the ties of familial relations,
and one’s larger social and ethical obligations” are there-
fore steps in the right direction.
But it seems to me that we could go a bit farther and
consider the problematic of proper names and language
acquisition within the framework of the rhetorical the-
ory of language foreshadowed by von Humboldt and ad-
vocated by Tyler. This would allow us to bring out more
clearly that what children know when they know what
a name is must necessarily be always incomplete. Rhet-
oric builds on the insufficiencies of language and exploits
them. This is why the rhetorical theory of language keeps
a keen eye on the gaps and lapses in communication and
alerts us to the fact that behind the said there is always
the unsaid, behind the spoken the unspeakable.
Like so many philosophers of language (Austin, Grice,
Searle, et al.) and so many “functional” linguists (Lev-
inson and Brown, Sperber and Wilson, Ochs and Schief-
felin, et al.), Shanker is close to rhetoric but never con-
sciously connects with it. This causes him to overlook,
as I have said, the fact that knowledge of proper names
must always be fragmentary.
paul j . thibault
Dipartimento di Scienze del Linguaggio, Universita`
Ca’Foscari di Venezia, Dorsoduro 1454, 30125 Venice,
Italy (mab1178@iperbole.bologna.it). 26 v 01
Shanker raises interesting issues concerning the prac-
tices whereby proper names are used to name individuals
in different cultures. I would like to add to his contri-
bution by drawing attention to some of the grammatical
features of proper names which enable these practices
to occur. In the first place, the distinction between com-
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mon nouns and proper nouns is not an absolute or all-
or-nothing one. The linguistic notion of instantiation is
important here (see Halliday and Matthiessen 1999:
14–15). Language users organize and interpret experience
in terms of ordered hierarchies of categories which are
internal to the organization of a particular language sys-
tem. These hierarchies of categories exhibit a scale of
what Langacker (1987:377–86) has called schematic-
ity—a scale of both semantic generality and semantic
specification. Higher-order or more schematic categories
have fewer semantic specifications; lower-level ones
have more and more specific specifications. A noun is
the grammatical class which realizes the semantic cat-
egory Thing. The category Thing is understood as the
most schematic category of the many more specific
“things” specified by the lower-level instantiations of
the schematic category Thing. Thus, “skyscraper,”
“bird,” “quark,” “cell,” “prisoner,” and so on, are more
specific instantiations of the schematic category Thing.
Moreover, the semantic specification of “sparrow” is
more specific than that for “bird” such that the latter is
schematic with respect to its lower-level instantiation.
In this perspective, proper nouns may be seen as maxi-
mally specific instantiations of the schematic category
Thing in contrast with common nouns, say, which are
relatively less instantiating.
In the clause “Harry Butler caught a taipan,” the
proper name “Harry Butler” designates a specific indi-
vidual who is identifiable by the interactants in some
discourse context, whereas “a taipan” designates an ar-
bitrary instance of the category in question. That is, this
nominal group is both nonspecific and nonreferential,
whereas the proper name “Harry Butler” is both specific
and referential. That is, it specifies a given entity as a
discourse participant which, once it has been so specified
by the instantiating and categorizing functions of the
nominal group, can be tracked through discourse by sub-
sequent pronominal and other mentions as referring to
the same participant. However, proper nouns, while
maximally specifying in terms of the hierarchy described
above, do, nonetheless, construe a schematicity relation,
though this is attenuated as compared with the degree
of schematicity evident in a common noun. The point
is that the difference is one of degree; it is not an absolute
distinction. For a start, proper nouns specify a unique
instance of some (set of) schematic categories. The se-
mantic specification “human: male” is schematic to the
name “Harry Butler” at the same time that “Harry But-
ler” is not schematic to “human: male.” The instantia-
tion relation is a one-way relation—from the schematic
category to the more specific one. This is also demon-
strated by the fact that I can say of some unworthy po-
litical figure, “He mistakenly thinks he’s another Win-
ston Churchill,” where “another Winston Churchill”
refers not to the historical individual, the wartime prime
minister of Great Britain, but to a nonspecific though
individual instance of the “Winston Churchill” type to
which the “he” in the sentence mistakenly believes him-
self to conform. This shows that the proper noun “Win-
ston Churchill” has schematic properties such that it
can be used to categorize specific instances (Davidse
1992:105). My main point here is that the act of referring
cannot be an epistemically private mental act because it
depends on the lexicogrammatical and semantic re-
sources of the language used. The semantics of referring
depends on those categories of “thing” that are built into
the intrinsic organization of a given language system. A
given act of referring necessarily requires reference to a
grounded instance in some discourse of the nominal
meanings that are part of the organization of a given
language. Leaving aside here any question concerning
the universal set of meanings that may or may not be
possible across all languages, I shall say that the more
limited though nevertheless vast and highly complex set
of categories made possible by the grammatical resources
of the noun for categorizing and interpreting the phe-
nomena of human experience as various classes of Thing
in a particular language are cultural categories which are,
however, necessary for the functioning of the individ-
ual’s brain in ontogenesis.
These proposals can help to clarify that reference is a
semiotically mediated process or activity in which, to
use the Peircean terminology, the object referred to is
represented in the activity of interpretants through the
mediation of representamena. In this way, we can avoid
the problem posed by the Cartesian approach, whereby
reference is an epistemically private mental act, at the
same time that we retain the important insight that ref-
erence to an object—perceived or imagined—is a se-
miotically mediated cognitive act embedded in situated
human activity. Just how the representamena is con-
strued as referring to its object depends on the interests
and orientations of the agents involved in this activity
in motivating an interpretant in responding to the re-
presentamena as a sign of the object referred to (Whitson
1997:144).
anna wierzbicka
Department of Anthropology, Research School for
Pacific Studies, Australian National University,
Canberra, A.C.T. 0200, Australia (anna.wierzbicka@
anu.edu.au). 17 iv 01
Shanker’s paper deals with questions of fundamental im-
portance. In my view, however, it is flawed insofar as it
couches these questions in terms of false alternatives.
This applies, above all, to the central question: “Should
the account of language acquisition be Cartesian or non-
Cartesian?” “Cartesian” means “nativist,” and “nativ-
ists” fall into two kinds again: “the Chomskyan nativ-
ists” and “the constraint theory nativists.” Shanker is
right, in my view, to reject these two nativisms as totally
inadequate, but he makes his task of refuting “nativism”
very easy by ignoring an entirely different “nativist” the-
ory, not so much “Cartesian” as “Leibnizian” (cf. Wierz-
bicka 2001a). This theory, which colleagues and I have
been developing since the mid-sixties, proposing it from
the start as an alternative to Chomsky’s so-called Car-
tesian linguistics, is known as the natural semantic me-
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talanguage theory. In fact, Chomskyan linguistics was
never fully “Cartesian,” because Descartes’s interest in
language was intrinsically linked with his interest in the
content of human thought, that is, with semantics,
whereas Chomskyan linguistics was from the start pro-
foundly non-semantic. In particular, Chomskyan lin-
guistics ignored Descartes’s key assumption (developed
by Leibniz) that there are innate and indefinable human
concepts which provide the bedrock of human cognition
and communication.
In the course of the past three decades, this funda-
mental idea was used as a guiding principle in a vast
body of empirical cross-linguistic investigations into se-
mantic universals within the natural-semantic-metalan-
guage framework, resulting in substantive hypotheses
about innate and universal human concepts and their
combinatory properties. The set of universal human con-
cepts uncovered includes 60 concepts identifiable in
terms of specific lexico-grammatical elements in all lan-
guages (cf. Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994, n.d.; Wierz-
bicka 1996, 1997; Goddard 1998, n.d.). These concepts
are I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING/THING, PEO-
PLE, BODY; THIS, THE SAME, OTHER; ONE, TWO,
SOME, ALL, MANY; GOOD, BAD; BIG, SMALL;
THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR; SAY,
WORD, TRUE; DO, HAPPEN, MOVE; THERE-IS,
HAVE; LIVE, DIE; WHEN, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A-
LONG-TIME, A-SHORT-TIME, FOR-SOME-TIME;
WHERE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE,
INSIDE; NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF; VERY,
MORE; KIND-OF, PART-OF; LIKE. Shanker says that
“recent research on concepts of space provides us with
an important example of how linguistic development
drives conceptual development,” but he doesn’t seem to
be aware that empirical cross-linguistic research has
identified certain conceptual universals of space, includ-
ing ABOVE, BELOW, and INSIDE, which can be seen as
providing a (presumably innate) basis for diverse con-
ceptual and linguistic development in any given
language.
In his neo-behaviourist emphasis on “social practices”
(to the exclusion of any innate conceptual tools in terms
of which experience could be organized by the individ-
ual), Shanker fails to draw a distinction between uni-
versal (presumably innate) human concepts and those
which are culture-specific (and therefore clearly not in-
nate). He is oblivious to the fact that studying “social
practices” requires a conceptual framework and that
without an independently justified conceptual frame-
work one usually ends up using, unwittingly, the frame-
work of one’s own native language—in most cases, Eng-
lish. He doesn’t ask in what language (i.e., in what
conceptual framework) social practices and their acqui-
sition should be discussed, and he ends up by attributing
to all cultures such blatantly Anglo concerns and values
as “self-esteem” and “autonomy” and using terms like
“intimacy” as universally applicable interpretive cate-
gories (cf. Wierzbicka 1991, 1992, 1997). Having ac-
knowledged some commonalities in Anglo-American
and Navajo use of proper names, Shanker concludes:
“What is much more striking that these commonalities,
however, is the differences.” He doesn’t say, however,
why we couldn’t—or shouldn’t—be interested in both
differences and commonalities, and he doesn’t seem to
see that we cannot study the differences between cul-
tures without some common measure and that if this
common measure is not to be ethnocentric it must be
based on concepts and categories occurring in all cultures
(and likely to be innate).
I am very much in sympathy with Shanker’s emphasis
on the need to study language acquisition in its cultural
context and to see the links between the acquisition of
language and the acquisition of culture. In my view, how-
ever, he is mistaken in seeing “nativism” of any kind as
either opposed or irrelevant to the study of cultures in
general and of the acculturation of children in particular.
As I see it, only a well-conceived “nativism” can provide
us with adequate conceptual tools for studying social
practices and their acquisition cross-culturally.
Shanker says that “nativism allows no scope for lin-
guistic anthropology to play a positive role in our un-
derstanding of how we know what we know about lan-
guage.” For Chomskyan and post-Chomskyan nativism
this is true, but a “nativism” linked with an empirical
search for conceptual and linguistic universals provides
both linguistic anthropology and the study of language
acquisition in a cultural context with a necessary con-
ceptual foundation and an effective analytical frame-
work, and it bears fruit in descriptive practice (cf., e.g.,
Wierzbicka 1999, 2001b; Harkins and Wierzbicka n.d.).
david zeitlyn
University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NZ, U.K.
(D.Zeitlyn@ukc.ac.uk). 29 iii 01
I agree with Shanker that linguistic anthropology pres-
ents a broadening of view from abstract linguistic com-
petence to embodied social competence (of which lan-
guage use is an important part). Another way to
strengthen the argument would be to move from the
exclusive consideration of naming to the wider field of
social deixis (Zeitlyn 1993). This would enable him to
consider acquisition of pronouns (which he mentions)
and of kin terms (e.g., Carter 1984). Overall, when study-
ing linguistic praxis, linguistic anthropologists take in-
spiration from pragmatics (Levinson 1983) and from cog-
nitive psychology (Clark 1996). Meaning takes a rela-
tively back-seat position, since the focus is not on
isolated (more or less solipsistic) individuals but on
groups of people interacting.
Shanker discusses the radical-translation problem, in
which Quine presents a reductio ad absurdum argument
against a denominative theory of meaning. Translation
is impossible only if meaning is denominative, that is
to say, if the meaning of words or phrases is modelled
on the meaning of proper names; change the account of
meaning and Quine’s radical-translation problem van-
ishes. However, as Shanker says, if the problem arises
in radical translation then it also occurs with our neigh-
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bours. So, if (big if) the basis of meaning is as assumed,
then we are forced into a form of solipsism. We are not
solipsists; ergo, the theory of meaning is wrong. Another
way to respond to Quine is to remark that the radical-
translation problem is not as normally described because
everyone can perform interpretive acts which are tan-
tamount to translation. Keesing (1985) uses the “prob-
lematic” of translation to urge caution in the search for
“metaphysics.” Anthropologists are apt, he suggests, to
mistake “conventional metaphor” (which implies no
metaphysical commitment) for metaphysical assertion.
However, he does not doubt the possibility of translation
but simply advocates caution and sensitivity.
Some papers by Robert Feleppa (1986, 1982) discuss
this issue as part of the “emic/etic” debate. Feleppa ar-
gues that a translation should not be seen as a set of
descriptive hypotheses and therefore that it is not sus-
ceptible to Quine’s underdetermination-by-evidence ar-
gument. Instead, he says, translations have more in com-
mon with rules, especially in that both are “violable”
without being refutable. Therefore he is able to agree
with Quine that translations lack truth values, but he
maintains that “they still have an empirically legitimate
roˆle, akin to that of technical definitions and rules of
inference” (1986:249). Translation establishes (or codi-
fies) the framework within which facts are expressed. It
is thus a necessary and important step in any ethno-
graphic description but is not susceptible to the same
sorts of criticisms levelled at “the facts” (pp. 248–49). It
is notable that Feleppa cites neither phenomenologists,
ethnomethodologists, nor sociolinguists in his bibliog-
raphy. Scheff (1987:365), in a short reply to Feleppa,
quotes Steiner and makes the telling comment “His ar-
gument about translatability is empirical in the sense
that there is a community of bilinguals to whom we can
appeal this (or any other) translation.” This leads us to
the possibility of “back translation.” Feleppa and Quine
are both guilty of the “denial of coevalness” (Fabian
1983). The anthropological subject is seen as “Other,”
and no dialogue is possible. Bilinguals can and do discuss
the adequacy of translations and thereby confute the rad-
ical-translation problem. Indeed, Quine (1960:47) allows
for this possibility but describes it as a “costly” solution:
“We can see a way, though costly, in which he can still
accomplish radical translation of [non-observational oc-
casion] sentences. He can settle down and learn the lan-
guage directly as an infant might. Having thus become
bilingual, he can translate the non-observational occa-
sion sentences by introspected stimulus synonymy.”
Dummett (1981:615) calls this the “anthropological so-
lution,” and indeed that is exactly what it is. He also
says (pp. 376–77): “If there is communication between
human beings at all, it must be possible for them to adopt
some determinate scheme of intertranslation.” In effect,
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I have tried to look at these replies in the manner of a
scientist who has just inserted a catalyst into a social
situation and is closely observing the agents’ reactions
in order to ascertain whether any significant patterns
emerge. (Please note that in the psychological as opposed
to the chemical use of the term, the catalyst itself is not
thought to remain unchanged by this process.) The point
of this sort of publication, as I see it, is to see what sorts
of questions the target paper raises and then assess
whether or in what way these questions might be
productive.
It strikes me that the replies reveal a noteworthy pat-
tern on precisely the matter of this “meta-question.”
Those who are most sympathetic to the generativist
framework can see little point in the sort of exercise
undertaken here (Atran and Lois, Stirton). Those who
find the generativist framework highly constrictive feel
that the paper raises important questions that need to
be explored in much greater depth (Armstrong, Hanks,
Rumsey, Rymes, Segerdahl, Strecker, ter Hark, Wierz-
bicka, Zeitlyn). Each paper raises important points that
demand careful scrutiny, but three closely interrelated
issues stand out:
1. What is the nature of Cartesianism? (see Stirton,
Strecker, ter Hark)
2. What is wrong, as ter Hark puts it, with saying that
“the mind/brain is genetically pre-programmed” for lin-
guistic behaviour? (see Armstrong, Atran and Lois,
Wierzbicka)
3. What is the nature of language? (see Armstrong,
Atran and Lois, Hanks, Rumsey, Rymes, Segerdahl, Zeit-
lyn) These are very much the questions that I was hoping
to raise in this paper.
Ter Hark asks whether the epistemological assump-
tions that I have described as “Cartesian” are better un-
derstood as the result of “referentialist” assumptions
about the use of psychological terms. I am not sure that
I see these arguments as mutually exclusive, but I cer-
tainly think that ter Hark is raising an important ques-
tion about the sources of Cartesian epistemology. More-
over, his reply serves as a warning not to construe
“Cartesianism” too narrowly, for example, as a distinc-
tive doctrine stemming from the writings of Descartes.
Rather, one can find elements of “Cartesian” thinking
in medieval and even classical Greek writings.
Stirton is also concerned about the notion of “Carte-
sianism” that I have sought to use, so it might be useful
to review briefly some of the key principles that I had
in mind. When I spoke about “Cartesianism” I was
thinking of such assumptions as that (1) the mind of an
isolated individual must impose order on reality by fram-
ing mental constructs; (2) subjects’ behaviour serves as
evidence for the mental processes or states they are ex-
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periencing or for the concepts they have constructed; (3)
one infers from their behaviour whether others experi-
ence the same mental states or possess the same con-
cepts as oneself; (4) terms such as “meaning,” “under-
standing,” and “reference” are the names of mental
processes or states; (5) language is some sort of rule-gov-
erned system for communicating (encoding and decod-
ing) thoughts from one mind to another; (6) in acquiring
language children are somehow “mapping” words onto
concepts; (7) we can never know for certain what concept
a child has mapped onto a word; and (8) children could
not acquire the same “word-concept” mappings as the
other members of their community unless their minds
were guided by some sort of “built-in constraints.”
A point that I was not thinking of at the time but I
agree is extremely important is the one Strecker makes
about the Cartesian bifurcation between reason and the
emotions. As he puts it, the human sciences need to
“heal the ‘Cartesian rift”’ and thus overcome “the al-
ienating separation of reason and passion.” This point
has especially important implications for the manner in
which we study language development. The psycholin-
guistic community has virtually ignored the role of emo-
tional development in a child’s language development,
even though anthropologists have shown that there is a
strong connection between emotional development and
culture (see Litz and White 1986).
What is so interesting about the Cartesian view of
emotions is that, like language, they are conceptualized
as a sort of “instinct.” The “basic” emotions are thought
to consist in the activation by an external stimulus of a
predetermined sequence of physiological, behavioural,
and experiential events (Ekman 1980). The stereotypical
facial expressions associated with a “basic” emo-
tion—which apparently are pan-cultural, universal (in
the sense that they emerge, at roughly the same age, in
blind as well as sighted children), and homologous with
nonhuman primate facial expressions—are treated as a
sign that the “basic” emotions are just such a sequence
of physiological, behavioural, and experiential events. In
other words, not only are the facial expressions, move-
ments, postures, etc., associated with a “basic” emotion
predetermined and automatic but so is what a subject
feels (Griffiths 1997).
Thus, as is the case with language, the Cartesian view
of emotions ignores the role of experience in children’s
development. Emotions are treated as part of their ge-
netic birthright; the “information” for the construction
of an “emotion module” is thought to be somehow con-
tained in genes and “potentiated” by appropriate stimuli.
What such a modularity approach overlooks, therefore,
is how social experiences shape children’s emotions. To
be sure, certain physiological conditions make it possible
for children to enter into the sorts of nurturing relation-
ships that enable them to share and thereby develop cer-
tain emotions (Fogel 1993). These emotional experiences
in turn affect how their central nervous systems function
or develop (Schore 1994, Johnson 1997). But neither fac-
tor can be reduced to the other, nor can either be ignored
in explaining emotional development (Greenspan 1997).
What makes this issue so relevant to the present dis-
cussion is that several of the commentators continue to
want to look at language development as an autonomous
phenomenon. It is clear from the work that has been
done with nonverbal autistic children that emotional
and linguistic development are intimately connected, for
these children typically begin to speak, spontaneously,
as soon as they reach a certain level of emotional de-
velopment (Greenspan and Wieder 1998). It would thus
seem to be the case that, as Vygotsky (1987) suggested,
one can explain neither children’s linguistic nor their
emotional development without considering how the
two elements interact with one another. Indeed, Barbara
King and I have recently explored the possibility that the
same points may apply to the striking results that were
seen in the research with the bonobo Kanzi (see Shanker
and King n.d.).
Thus, the deeper reason this question of whether emo-
tions constitute a critical element of the development
of language skills is relevant concerns the issue of
whether or in what sense language is somehow geneti-
cally predetermined. As Armstrong and ter Hark point
out, much as one may be opposed to nativist thinking,
one can hardly deny that language is a species-typical
human trait. Furthermore, Wierzbicka raises the impor-
tant point that her research program has documented
more than 60 universal semantic concepts. But then, as
Gottlieb (1997) shows in his critique of genetic deter-
minism, universal does not entail innate. One is not
compelled to adopt the genetic determinist position that
species-typical traits are canalized (i.e., strongly buffered
from environmental perturbations by an organism’s
genes); rather, one can adopt the dynamic-systems-the-
ory view that species-typical circumstances are essential
for the development of species-typical traits.
According to dynamic systems theory, at each level of
a developmental system “the effect of any level of influ-
ence is dependent on the rest of the system, making all
factors potentially interdependent and mutually con-
straining” (Gottlieb, Wahlsten, and Lickliter 1998:260).
Hence, “the minimum unit for developmental analysis
must be the developmental system, comprised of both
the organism and the set of physical, biological, and so-
cial factors with which it interacts over the course of
development.” But when we look at the biological fac-
tors that are imperative for language development what
we are looking for is just that, biological factors, and not
some vehicle for importing implicit epistemological as-
sumptions (e.g., about the child’s a priori knowledge of
the abstract “structure” of language).
The biological factors that appear to be crucial for lan-
guage development relate to the child’s ability to self-
regulate, to take in and respond to the world, to engage
in relationships with other people, and to engage in co-
regulated communicative activities. Also important here
are the “executive functions,” among them attention,
inhibition, cognitive flexibility, organized searching,
planning, and working memory (Pennington et al. 1997).
All of these factors—reactivity to stimuli, capacity to
process sensations, motor control, and executive func-
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tions—are themselves dependent on species-typical cir-
cumstances for their development. In other words, close
nurturing relationships with caregivers are as much part
of the biological as of the social factors that are critical
for the development of language skills.
The crux of my response to the second of the three
major issues outlined above, therefore, is that, in place
of the linear, simple cause-effect models that obtain on
the maturational view of language acquisition, we need
to look instead for bi-directional, context-sensitive, dy-
namic-systems-oriented approaches to language devel-
opment. Rather than looking at language develop-
ment—or any aspect of a child’s development—in terms
of a genetically determined “neural module” which
needs the appropriate “input” during a “critical period”
in order to function properly, we need to look instead at
how all of the levels involved in the care of the child
interact in the emergence of complex skills and abilities
(see Shanker n.d.a).
It is not just our views about the manner in which
children develop language skills that is affected by this
shift from genetic determinist to dynamic-systems
thinking, however, but, as several of the commentators
point out, our views about the very nature of the skills
that they thereby develop. I was fascinated by Rumsey’s
and Zeitlyn’s extension of the argument about proper
names to the use of pronouns. One of the most curious
of the various traits typically seen in young children with
autism is pronoun reversal. For some time now theorists
have speculated that this phenomenon is bound up with
the children’s social deficits, but no one has yet for-
mulated a satisfactory explanation of the social-emo-
tional-linguistic ties operating here. Rumsey’s discus-
sion of Benveniste’s remarks on “the condition of man
in language” suggests that there is indeed a complex,
interactive process going on in the social-linguistic-emo-
tional nexus.
As Rumsey puts it, the “‘condition of dialogue’ among
perspective-swapping human subjects is built into lan-
guage itself.” We would be reluctant to describe chil-
dren’s communicative behaviours as “linguistic” if they
lacked the capacity to engage in dialogic interactions.
Language is not at all like a code which suddenly appears
in children at some predetermined age; rather, children
develop language skills in the context of co-regulating
such primal activities as sharing, requesting, imitating,
and playing. They are increasingly motivated to use and
develop these potential communicational tools so that
they may achieve context-dependent interactional goals:
goals which themselves develop as a function of chil-
dren’s developing communicational environment and
their growing abilities and increasingly differentiated
affects.
If one assumes ab initio that language is “an auton-
omous, decontextualizable biplanar code” (Toolan 1996:
3), then one is bound to place great emphasis on issues
that are designed to test children’s possession of such a
“code” (e.g., the so-called creativity problem, the “pov-
erty of the stimulus” argument, or “grammaticality”
tests). And if one assumes from the outset that acqui-
sition of this “code” can only be viewed as a matura-
tional phenomenon, then one is bound to find reasons
that Kanzi’s communicative behaviours or those of a
child who, through intensive therapy, has recovered from
specific language impairment should not be described in
linguistic terms (e.g., because of morphosyntactic defi-
cits, the “dual mechanism” hypothesis, or problems that
the subject encounters with a quintessentially Cartesian
construct like the “theory of mind” task). The possibility
that these arguments are a product of Cartesian presup-
positions about the nature of language is never consid-
ered, for one is committed from the start to the premise
that there is a categorial distinction between the “lan-
guage system” as formally defined and other forms of
communication. By challenging this discontinuity view
one is arguing not simply that language skills emerge
from communicative development but, further, that
these language skills cannot be divorced from their com-
municative function (see Halliday 1975).
I have looked elsewhere at the sources of these familiar
generativist critiques of ape language research and the
positive therapeutic results obtained with children di-
agnosed with specific language impairment (see Savage-
Rumbaugh, Shanker, and Taylor 1998, Shanker n.d.a). I
certainly do not wish to minimize the importance of the
questions that these critiques raise—or for that matter,
the questions that they ignore. Rather than trying to
summarize that material here, however, I will reiterate
the central reason I argue in this paper that linguistic
anthropology poses a fundamental challenge to the na-
tivist view that we all “grow” an identical telementa-
tional code that enables us to “encode” and “decode”
our thoughts. What linguistic anthropology shows us is
that what children learn when they learn how to speak
and, accordingly, the explanation of how children learn
how to speak cannot be divorced from the sociocultural
environment in which these skills and abilities are con-
stituted and nurtured.
Hanks takes this argument forward in a manner which
I think will prove absolutely vital to the fortunes of a
non-Cartesian approach to the study of language devel-
opment. His concern about equating practice with rule-
governed routines is, I think, an extremely important
point and one that needs to be explored in precisely the
manner that he indicates. As does Strecker, he suggests
that a non-Cartesian approach to the study of referring
(or any speech act) demands the combined fruits of lin-
guistics, philosophy, psychology, and anthropology. We
need to look at the specific features of a particular natural
language, the reflexive practices of the speakers of that
language, and what actually goes on when speakers in-
teract with one another linguistically (see Taylor 1997).
But Hanks is not suggesting that language is simply too
complex a phenomenon to be adequately investigated by
any one discipline alone; rather, the very nature of lan-
guage is such that it demands such a seamless interdis-
ciplinary approach.
Armstrong and Rymes present further powerful rea-
sons, specifically relating to the construct of proper
names, for why, in Armstrong’s words, “the Neo-Car-
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tesian approach, with its simplifying assumptions, de-
nies the richness of [the] socially emergent connections”
between language and culture. Rymes’s “cross-commu-
nity perspective” on the use of the same name (with the
same referent) provides a wonderful example of exactly
this point by showing how the significance of a name
varies according to the community of practice within
which that name is used. But, as Rymes points out, the
import of such a cross-cultural perspective does not sim-
ply lie in the fact that it provides us with “needed relief
from a tired Cartesian nativism”; at a deeper level, lin-
guistic anthropology provides us with a means of “re-
conceptualizing the world, the language practices that
construct it, and our actions within it.” As Segerdahl
explains, “Children’s language development . . . is es-
sentially connected with becoming human, with becom-
ing a natural participant in our human situations and
ways of doing things together; that is where words belong
and are at home, where they have their uses and natural
points.”
There could be no more fitting note on which to con-
clude this discussion.
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